Chief Fire Officer and 2 others v Siewnarine Ramsaran (Trinidad and Tobago)

Under the Public Service Commission Regulations, an “eligible fire officer” is one who satisfies the office qualifications under regulation 9. A job description cannot, by itself, alter statutory eligibility or impose a binding qualification. The appointment authority must notify all eligible officers, allow at least seven days for representations, and forward those representations for consideration. Fairness requires notice of the opportunity, timing and relevant factors, especially any proposed absolute requirement. An uncertain experience criterion should be treated as a general factor rather than a disqualifying cut-off. Breach of these procedural rights may violate constitutional protection of the law where the resulting detriment cannot be cured by judicial review, and damages may be available. The separate equality claim was not determined.

The appellant, a retired Divisional Fire Officer, challenged repeated appointments of another officer as acting Deputy Chief Fire Officer. He alleged that the Chief Fire Officer and the Public Service Commission failed to apply the statutory appointment procedure, denied him a fair opportunity to make representations, and breached his constitutional rights.

Mohammed J granted declarations, ordered reconsideration and found a breach of the right to equality of treatment, but rejected the protection-of-the-law claim. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal and dismissed the appellant’s cross-appeal, holding that he was not eligible because he lacked the required qualification and experience. The Board considered eligibility, the operation of the appointment procedure, and the constitutional consequences of the failures.

1. Eligibility and decision-maker. The appeal succeeded on eligibility. Under the Public Service Commission Regulations, the Commission was responsible for appointing an officer by promotion. The Chief Fire Officer could make a recommendation, but the recommendation did not bind the Commission. “Eligible fire officer” meant a fire officer who satisfied the qualifications of the office under regulation 9. The appellant therefore remained eligible at all material times. The lower courts had wrongly treated requirements in the Job Description as part of statutory eligibility.
2. Job description and fairness. Regulation 158 supplied general and specific considerations for promotion. It did not rank them or make every item an absolute threshold. The Board observed that the Commission might structure its procedures through forms, interviews and specific recommendations, but the Chief Fire Officer’s Job Description could not itself impose a binding qualification. Fairness required fair notice of any matter bearing on appointment, including whether it was an absolute requirement. Applying the guidance in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, notice had to identify the opportunity to make representations, the relevant time-frame and the substance of the factors likely to affect the decision. The phrase “six years at a senior managerial/administrative level” was too uncertain to operate as an absolute cut-off. It could be considered as a factor, with weight depending on seniority and length of experience.
3. Procedural breaches. The respondents failed to notify all eligible officers when appointments fell to be made, failed to give the appellant a full and fair opportunity to make representations, failed to forward his application and later complaint to the Commission, and appointed Mr Layne without the Commission considering the appellant. These failures occurred in March 2019, May 2019, after the appellant’s qualification in August 2019 and in April 2020. The appeal therefore succeeded on the lawfulness of the appointments.
4. Constitutional remedy. The failures denied the appellant statutory procedural rights and breached his right to protection of the law under section 4(b) of the Constitution. Judicial review could not provide a prompt and effective remedy because the breaches were initially unknown and the lost opportunity could no longer be restored. Following Charles v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2022] UKPC 49; [2023] 1 WLR 177, damages were available and had to be assessed, including by considering the likelihood that the appellant would have been appointed. The matter was remitted to the High Court. The Board did not determine the separate section 4(d) claim.

• Privy Council: Allowed the appeal to the extent stated, upheld the section 4(b) claim, and remitted the matter to the High Court for damages assessment.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: Allowed the respondents’ appeal and dismissed the appellant’s cross-appeal, holding that the appellant was not eligible for appointment.
• High Court: Mohammed J granted declarations, ordered reconsideration and found a breach of the right to equality of treatment, but rejected the protection-of-the-law claim.