Quintain City Park Gate Birmingham Limited v The Secretary of State for Transport

On an appeal concerning a Certificate of Appropriate Alternative Development, the Tribunal must determine the proposed development as if the application had been made to it initially, applying its own planning judgment. Its judicial function is narrower than that of a local planning authority: it resolves the dispute on the parties’ evidence and cannot redesign an inadequately supported scheme.

CAAD applications for neighbouring land may provide evidence or analogies concerning market expectations, including likely future development, but they do not themselves constitute planning permissions or material planning considerations. Detailed cumulative assessment requires information reasonably knowable at the valuation date.

A large development may offer flexibility between uses, but the certificate must define development sufficiently clearly and may require minimum floorspace and a balanced mix. A scheme allowing a substantial area to become a monoculture of student accommodation was inconsistent with the development plan.

The appeal arose from Birmingham City Council’s failure to determine an application under section 17 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 for a Certificate of Appropriate Alternative Development relating to land compulsorily acquired for HS2.

The appellant sought certification of a large, flexible mixed-use scheme including residential accommodation, offices, hotel, retail and purpose-built student accommodation. The Secretary of State accepted that a smaller mixed-use scheme was appropriate alternative development, but opposed the appellant’s scale, design and proposed flexibility over the balance between residential and student accommodation.

The Tribunal had previously determined common issues concerning neighbouring CAADs and student-accommodation need. The central questions were the proper use of neighbouring CAAD applications, the cumulative effects of anticipated development, the Tribunal’s role on a section 18 appeal, and whether the proposed scheme complied with planning policy.

1. Tribunal’s function. The appeal was against a deemed nil certificate. Under section 18(2) of the Land Compensation Act 1961, the Tribunal had to consider the matters as if the application had been made to it initially. It had to apply its own planning judgment, but its judicial task was to resolve the parties’ dispute on the evidence. It was not required to certify every possible description of development and could not invite the appellant to redesign its scheme or devise a materially different scheme without evidential foundation.
2. Neighbouring development. The cancellation assumption did not authorise speculation about events between the cancellation date and valuation date. Nevertheless, objective circumstances known to the market could include a reasonable expectation that applications for neighbouring land would be brought forward within a reasonable time. Post-valuation CAAD applications could be used as analogies or illustrations of market expectations, subject to scrutiny for later events and differences in circumstances. They could not be treated as planning applications or permissions.
3. Cumulative effects and alternatives. A general expectation of large-scale mixed-use development on adjoining sites was relevant, but the market could not be assumed to know their detailed building form, massing, height or layout. A detailed cumulative assessment based on that unknown information was therefore inappropriate. Alternative development was normally irrelevant absent planning conflict or harm, and there was no rule requiring refusal merely because another scheme could secure similar benefits with less harm.
4. Appellant’s scheme. The proposed 32-storey tower and linked group of towers would be out of keeping with the immediate context. The western frontage would create an overbearing and impermeable wall, contrary to relevant design and place-making policies. The realignment of Freeman Street was not itself unacceptable and any harm to the Fox and Grapes was negligible and outweighed by the benefits of restoration and reuse. The proposal caused no harm to the setting of Moor Street Station. The evidence did not establish that residential amenity or daylight justified refusal.
5. Mix of uses and certificate. The development plan was not prescriptive of a particular mix, but it required variety, balanced communities and sustainable neighbourhoods. On the facts, permitting the appellant to use most of the site for PBSA, with no general residential provision, would promote a monoculture and would not diversify Eastside’s overall offer. A certificate could contain several flexible descriptions of development, with conditions defining each form. Minimum floorspace requirements and phasing controls were justified.
6. Disposition. The appellant’s proposal was not likely to have obtained planning permission at the valuation date. The Secretary of State’s scheme was agreed to constitute appropriate alternative development. The Tribunal directed the parties to provide a draft certificate describing that scheme and the determined conditions.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): The Tribunal determined the section 18 appeal against the deemed nil certificate and directed preparation of a certificate for the Secretary of State’s agreed scheme.
• Earlier related proceedings: The Tribunal’s determination of common issues concerning neighbouring sites and student accommodation is recorded at [2025] UKUT 7 (LC). The neighbouring-site issue had also been considered in proceedings culminating in [2023] UKSC 30, on appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 651 and [2020] UKUT 37 (LC).