Jasbinder Weerasekera v Satinder Rait

Where a party withdraws proceedings and promptly seeks to resume them, the tribunal must consider whether the communication should be treated as an application for reinstatement, even if it is expressed as an appeal or uses imprecise language. The overriding objective requires flexibility, particularly where the party is unrepresented. The reinstatement discretion is unrestricted, but must be exercised fairly and by considering all the circumstances, including the reasons for withdrawal, prejudice, finality, good administration and, where proportionate, the merits. The absence of exceptional circumstances is not an additional requirement. Natural disappointment caused by reopening a concluded matter is relevant but may carry limited weight.

The appellant had been permitted by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) to withdraw from two land-registration references. A week later she sent an email raising substantive concerns and asking the authorities to review the matter. The FTT treated the communication as an application for permission to appeal against the withdrawal order and refused permission.

The Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal on the issue whether the email should instead have been treated as an application for reinstatement under rule 22(5) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. The merits of the underlying property dispute were outside the appeal.

1. Appeal allowed. The FTT’s decision was set aside and the appellant’s case was reinstated.
2. The appellant’s email was ambiguous, but it clearly indicated that she wished to continue participating in the references as if she had not withdrawn. That relief required reinstatement, not an appeal against an order which she had herself sought. The FTT could and should have treated the email as an application under rule 22(5), applying the overriding objective. This approach was particularly appropriate because the appellant was acting in person and the FTT itself had directed her attention towards an appeal without explaining the reinstatement power.
3. Rule 22 imposed no restriction on the tribunal’s discretion whether to reinstate a withdrawn case. The discretion had to be exercised consistently with the overriding objective in rule 3. Relevant matters included the reasons for withdrawal, prejudice to the other party, the loss caused by refusal, the public interest in finality and legal certainty, good administration, and the merits so far as they could conveniently and proportionately be assessed. These matters were not a fixed or exhaustive checklist, and there was no requirement for exceptional justification.
4. The appellant had withdrawn while under substantial personal and financial pressure and sought reinstatement within a week. There was no evidence that her conduct was opportunistic or an abuse of process. The respondent’s prejudice amounted to natural and legitimate disappointment at reopening a matter thought to be settled. The public interest in finality was relevant, but the Rules specifically provided for reinstatement. Any issue about the scope of the FTT’s jurisdiction could be addressed by case management.
5. It was inappropriate to assess the merits of the proposed underlying dispute on the limited information available. Weighing all the circumstances, reinstatement was appropriate.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): The FTT’s treatment of the appellant’s communication as an application for permission to appeal was held to be wrong. The Upper Tribunal substituted an order reinstating the appellant’s case.
• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): Permission to withdraw was granted on 17 March 2025. The FTT subsequently treated the appellant’s communication as an application for permission to appeal and refused permission on 24 April 2025.