Mikhail Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks LLC & Anor

At common law, presence in England and Wales at the time of service is a substantive jurisdictional requirement grounded in territoriality. Compliance with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 does not, without more, displace that requirement. Temporary physical absence may be compatible with presence, but the exception is narrow. An indefinite, state-enforced exclusion preventing a defendant from returning creates a definite break in the pattern of life. Ownership of a UK home, staffing and an intention to return do not establish presence or residence. The claimant must obtain permission to serve out under CPR rule 6.36 and an applicable gateway. If permission is granted, alternative service at a UK address may then be sought under rule 6.15.

The respondents served a claim form at Athlone House, the appellant’s former UK home, after he had left the United Kingdom and become subject to an indefinite travel ban under the Immigration Act 1971 following sanctions designation. The High Court held that service was valid because Athlone House was his usual or last known residence under CPR rule 6.9, and dismissed his jurisdiction challenge: [2025] EWHC 300 (Comm).

On appeal, the appellant argued that common-law jurisdiction required presence in England and Wales and that the travel ban made such presence impossible. The respondents argued that the CPR had superseded the common-law rule, or that compliance with CPR rule 6.9 was sufficient. The central issue was whether service at Athlone House was valid despite the appellant’s enforced exclusion.

1. The appeal was allowed. Lord Justice Lewison gave the judgment, with Lord Justice Phillips and Sir Launcelot Henderson agreeing. Service at Athlone House did not confer personal jurisdiction as of right.
2. The common-law requirement of presence is substantive, not merely procedural. It arises from international law and the principle of territoriality. The court’s jurisdiction over an individual is ordinarily founded on presence within England and Wales and due service there. Recognised alternatives include submission, a convention or specific statutory provision, and permission to serve out. The CPR must be interpreted against that background of territoriality and international comity.
3. The procedural provisions of CPR Part 6, including rule 6.9, do not by themselves authorise service on a person who is not amenable to the jurisdiction. Compliance with the CPR does not conclusively establish jurisdiction. The reasoning in Kamali that the CPR had displaced the common-law principle could not stand with Barclays and Masri. The reasoning in SSL International was preferred. The Court of Appeal was entitled to choose between conflicting decisions of its own and had to follow the earlier House of Lords authority.
4. Temporary absence does not necessarily negate presence, but the concept must remain within narrow bounds. Whether absence is temporary is an objective, fact-sensitive question. A stated intention to return is relevant, but the court must assess the realistic prospects of putting it into effect and distinguish intention from mere hope.
5. The appellant’s indefinite, state-enforced exclusion was not temporary absence. He could not lawfully enter, occupy or use Athlone House, and there was no foreseeable prospect of return. His ownership of the property, its staffing and his declared intention to return were insufficient. In ordinary terms he was neither present nor resident there after 27 September 2023.
6. If the respondents wished to proceed, they had to obtain permission to serve out under rule 6.36, relying on one or more gateways in PD 6B. If permission were granted, they could seek substituted service at Athlone House under rule 6.15.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The appeal was allowed. The court held that service at Athlone House was ineffective to establish personal jurisdiction as of right.
2. High Court of Justice, Commercial Court. Bryan J held that the appellant remained resident within the jurisdiction and that Athlone House was his usual or last known residence for service under [2025] EWHC 300 (Comm). His jurisdiction challenge under CPR Part 11 failed.