Kamran Safi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Risk-on-return appeals under Articles 2 and 3 require an individual assessment of whether the person faces a real risk of unlawful killing or inhuman or degrading treatment. Widespread poverty alone does not establish an Article 3 breach through material deprivation; the relevant question is whether the individual faces intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy. A specialist fact-finding tribunal may rely on substantial, specific expert evidence that was left unchallenged. Its reasons need not record every inferential step. A cumulative combination of personal vulnerability, trafficking history, Westernisation and country-specific evidence may establish the required risk.

The Secretary of State appealed against an Upper Tribunal decision dated 1 March 2024, which had dismissed her appeal from a First-tier Tribunal decision dated 17 July 2023. The First-tier Tribunal had allowed an Afghan national’s appeal against deportation on Articles 2 and 3 grounds, finding a real risk arising from his vulnerability, trafficking history, Westernisation and conditions on return, including destitution. It did not determine medical Article 3 or Article 8 grounds. The central issues were whether the tribunal had relied impermissibly on general country conditions, applied the wrong threshold for material deprivation, or given inadequate reasons.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that the Upper Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the First-tier Tribunal had made no error of law in allowing the appeal under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. The relevant Article 3 inquiry is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that removal would expose the individual to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment: Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439. Extreme material deprivation can engage Article 3 where there is a real risk of intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy. Widespread poverty alone is insufficient: Ainte [2021] UKUT 203 (IAC).
3. Appellate review must respect the specialist fact-finding role of the First-tier Tribunal. The principles approved in Kapikanya [2025] EWCA Civ 987 require restraint where reasoning is compressed, a matter is not expressly mentioned, or reasoning is stated by inference. The tribunal is presumed to know and apply relevant authorities unless its language indicates otherwise.
4. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to accept the substantial expert evidence, particularly the evidence specific to the claimant, concerning re-trafficking risk, vulnerability and Westernisation. Because the reports had not been challenged by requiring the experts to attend for cross-examination, the Secretary of State was in difficulty in advancing arguments contrary to them: TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2025] AC 374 [2023] UKSC 48.
5. The court doubted whether the findings on destitution, standing alone, would have provided a sound basis for the appeal. They did not stand alone. The cumulative evidence was sufficient to support the findings of real risk under Articles 2 and 3. The heightened deportation threshold in section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 was not engaged because the case concerned risk on return rather than Article 8.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 20 February 2026, dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal.
• Upper Tribunal: On 1 March 2024, dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, holding that the First-tier Tribunal’s reasons were sufficient.
• First-tier Tribunal: On 17 July 2023, allowed the claimant’s appeal against the deportation order under Articles 2 and 3. The tribunal did not determine the medical Article 3 or Article 8 grounds.
• Permission to appeal: Permission was refused by the Upper Tribunal because the application was six days late. On renewal, Lewis LJ granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on 14 August 2025.