Seyi Omooba v Michael Garrett Associated Limited (T/A Global Artists) & Anor

For direct discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, the tribunal must identify the factual reason why for less favourable treatment. A protected belief may form part of the context, or a but-for cause, without being an operative reason. Motive remains distinct from reason. The separability approach helps distinguish a protected characteristic from associated conduct or a genuinely dysfunctional situation, but is not a rule of law. Inaction does not readily constitute harassment, and interference with Convention rights does not automatically violate dignity. Employment tribunals retain case-management powers to restrict publication of disclosed documents. The jurisdiction to reopen a permission decision is truly exceptional and requires a powerful probability of significant injustice.

The appellant, an actress, brought claims against her agent and the theatre after her contracts were terminated following a social-media controversy concerning her religious beliefs and the role she had agreed to play. The Employment Tribunal rejected her discrimination, harassment and breach of contract claims, awarded costs and ordered the removal of hearing documents from websites. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed her appeal in [2024] EAT 30 (also reported at [2024] IRLR 440). Bean LJ subsequently refused permission to appeal. The appellant applied under CPR Part 52.30 to reopen that refusal, relying principally on the later Court of Appeal decision in Higgs v Farmor’s School. The central issues were whether the decisions were inconsistent and whether Bean LJ had failed to grapple with the proposed grounds of appeal.

1. Application dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the application to reopen Bean LJ’s refusal of permission to appeal. The threshold under Part 52.30 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 is truly exceptional. Reopening requires circumstances making it necessary to avoid real injustice, exceptional circumstances making reopening appropriate and no alternative effective remedy. The earlier proceedings must have been critically undermined, with a powerful probability that significant injustice occurred.
2. A judge deciding permission must grapple with the essential points raised. The required degree of detail depends on the circumstances. A failure to grapple, or a mistake corrupting the whole process, may satisfy the rule only when accompanied by a powerful probability of a different result. Bean LJ’s reasons showed that he had considered the Employment Tribunal’s findings, the EAT’s analysis and the arguments on Grounds 1 and 2.
3. The later decision in Higgs v Farmor’s School was not inconsistent. In Higgs, the reason for dismissal was the manner in which protected beliefs were expressed, and proportionality was the central issue. Here, the reason-why issue itself was disputed.
4. Under section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010, the reason why treatment occurred is ordinarily a question of fact for the Employment Tribunal. A protected characteristic must have had a significant influence or been a material part of that reason. It is insufficient that the characteristic formed part of the surrounding circumstances or that the treatment would not have occurred but for it. Motive does not determine the issue. A respondent cannot simply rely on discriminatory reactions by others, but a genuinely dysfunctional situation may be the operative reason for action. The separability approach is a fact-finding tool, not a rule of law.
5. The court made additional observations on the remaining grounds. A Convention-rights interference does not necessarily amount to a violation of dignity under section 26 of the Equality Act 2010. The Employment Tribunal had jurisdiction under its general case-management powers to restrict publication of disclosed documents. CPR 31.22(2) permits restrictions even where documents have been referred to at a public hearing, and the privacy rule did not exhaust that jurisdiction. The contract and costs arguments disclosed no basis for reopening.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 13 March 2026, dismissed the application to reopen Bean LJ’s refusal of permission to appeal and declined to grant permission.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Bean LJ refused permission to appeal from the EAT by order dated 10 July 2024.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Eady J dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the Employment Tribunal in [2024] EAT 30, also reported at [2024] IRLR 440.
• Employment Tribunal: Rejected the discrimination, harassment and breach of contract claims, awarded costs and made an order concerning publication of hearing documents. No citation is stated in the judgment.