Lee Mavin v Karen Wyatt

In contempt proceedings, a court may proceed in the defendant’s absence, or sentence in absence, where the defendant knows of the right to legal representation, has had a fair opportunity to obtain it, and has been warned of the consequences of non-attendance. Whether a further adjournment or bench warrant is required depends on the procedural history, including prior adjournments, repeated late applications and the reasons given for absence. A committal court must confine itself to contempts alleged in the application. Further allegations require amendment, notice and any necessary adjournment. Procedural defects affecting some findings may require the sentence to be set aside and reconsidered even where the remaining findings are upheld.

The appellant was a tenant in possession proceedings brought by the respondent, his landlord. The respondent alleged that he had repeatedly misused the breathing space moratorium scheme to delay eviction, including by supplying false reference numbers and forged documents. HHJ Melissa Clarke found him in contempt on seven counts on 16 April 2025 and sentenced him to nine months’ immediate imprisonment on 25 June 2025, both orders being made in his absence.

The appellant challenged the orders on procedural grounds, including lack of notice of two counts, failure to accommodate his health vulnerabilities, inadequate opportunity for legal representation, and the decision to proceed in his absence. He also sought extensions of time and permission to adduce fresh evidence. The central issues were whether the contempt findings and sentencing process were procedurally fair and what consequence followed from any irregularity.

The appeal was allowed in part. The Court of Appeal, comprising Baker LJ and Snowden LJ, allowed the appeal against counts 6 and 7, dismissed it against counts 1 to 5, set aside the nine-month sentence, and directed that sentence be determined by the Court of Appeal on a later occasion.

1. The application for an extension of time was granted. The Denton principles for relief from sanctions apply to an extension of time to appeal a committal order: Yaxley-Lennon v Solicitor-General [2025] EWCA Civ 476. The failure to inform the appellant of his appeal rights, his prompt action after learning of those rights, and the fact that his liberty was at stake justified relief.
2. As to fresh evidence, CPR rule 52.11(2) gives the appeal court a discretion over evidence not before the lower court. The Ladd v Marshall criteria [1954] 1 WLR 1489, although no longer primary rules, effectively occupy the field of relevant considerations: Terluk v Berezovsky [2011] EWCA Civ 1534. Evidence already before the lower court was not fresh. Medical evidence explaining non-attendance also had to satisfy the guidance in Levy v Ellis-Carr [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch), approved in Bruce v Wychavon District Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1389.
3. The inclusion of counts 6 and 7 was procedurally unfair. There had been no proper application to amend, no supporting evidence and no notice to the appellant. Applying Inplayer Limited v Thorogood [2014] EWCA Civ 1511, a committal court must confine itself to the contempts alleged in the application. If further contempts are to be considered, amendment and any necessary adjournment must be allowed.
4. The findings on counts 1 to 5 were upheld. A committal court must ensure that the defendant knows of the right to legal representation and has a fair opportunity to obtain it. The appellant had received an order explaining those rights, had been given repeated opportunities and warnings, and had not secured representation. In the circumstances, the judge was entitled to proceed on 16 April after the appellant attended and then left, and to sentence him in absence on 25 June after three adjournments. A further bench warrant was not mandatory.
5. The procedural defect concerning counts 6 and 7 affected the sentencing exercise. The appellant was to be sentenced for five rather than seven contempts, committed over a shorter period, which could affect both totality and whether imprisonment should be suspended. The original sentence was therefore set aside. The Court of Appeal would determine the appropriate sentence after receiving a medical report and a further statement from the appellant.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Time to appeal was extended. The appeal was allowed against counts 6 and 7 and dismissed against counts 1 to 5. The nine-month immediate custodial sentence was set aside, with resentencing to take place before the Court of Appeal.
2. Milton Keynes and Oxford County Court. HHJ Melissa Clarke found the appellant in contempt on seven counts on 16 April 2025 and sentenced him to nine months’ immediate imprisonment on 25 June 2025. Both orders were made in his absence.