Jakir Ahmed v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

In parallel immigration and family-court proceedings, an immigration tribunal must decide whether Article 8 requires an individual to remain in the United Kingdom until the family proceedings conclude. Pending contact proceedings create no automatic right to remain. The tribunal should assess their materiality, any compelling public-interest reasons for exclusion, whether they are being used to delay or frustrate immigration action, and the available welfare-related evidence. That evidence may provide pointers to the child’s welfare, but the immigration tribunal must not decide the family court’s ultimate best-interests question. If Article 8 requires continued presence, allowing the appeal to enable limited leave and adjourning the immigration appeal are alternative courses with no hierarchy.

The appellant appealed against refusal of leave to remain as the parent of a British-national child. At the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, he also had pending proceedings in the family court seeking a child arrangements order. The First-tier Tribunal found that he had had no direct contact with his daughter for more than three years, had shown little commitment to progressing the family proceedings, and had used them to delay the immigration process. It held that Article 8 did not require him to remain in the United Kingdom pending those proceedings and dismissed the appeal.

The Upper Tribunal dismissed his appeal on 19 February 2025. In the Court of Appeal, he challenged the factual findings, contended that the First-tier Tribunal had prejudged the child’s best interests, and argued that it had misunderstood the guidance in RS. The central issue was the proper approach where immigration and family-court proceedings run concurrently.

Appeal dismissed unanimously. Permission to adduce family-court orders made after the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was refused because the evidence did not assist in determining whether the tribunals had erred.

1. The principles in Ciliz v The Netherlands Application no. 2192/95 recognise that, depending on the circumstances, immigration action may need to be coordinated with family proceedings to avoid frustrating meaningful participation in the family process. The guidance in RS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKUT 218 (IAC), endorsed in Mohan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1363; [2013] 1 WLR 922, applies generally where immigration proceedings and family-court proceedings coexist. It is not confined to cases involving criminal offending, adverse immigration history, or imminent removal.
2. The tribunal must determine whether the individual has at least an Article 8 right to remain until the family proceedings conclude. If so, it must decide whether to allow the appeal so that limited leave may be granted or to adjourn the immigration appeal. Those courses are alternative means of securing compliance with Article 8; neither has priority. An undertaking by the Secretary of State not to remove the individual does not remove the tribunal’s obligation to determine the Article 8 issue, as explained in MS (Ivory Coast) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 133.
3. The questions in paragraph 43 of RS are contextual parts of that determination, not an abstract checklist. The tribunal may consider the materiality of the family proceedings, compelling public-interest reasons for exclusion, whether the proceedings were instituted to delay or frustrate immigration action, the individual’s previous interest and contact, the timing and commitment shown, the likely timescale, and available materials indicating where the child’s welfare may lie.
4. The tribunal must not make the family court’s final decision about the child’s best interests or contact. It may assess current evidence as pointers relevant to whether determining the immigration appeal before the family proceedings conclude would be compatible with Article 8. The First-tier Tribunal’s statement that the child’s best interests were to remain with her mother without contact was inaptly and too strongly worded when read in isolation, but the decision read as a whole did not prejudge the family proceedings and applied the RS guidance.
5. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to infer from the prolonged absence of direct contact, the move to York, delay in commencing the contact proceedings, non-attendance at a family-court hearing, and prolonged inactivity that the appellant had shown little commitment to progressing the proceedings. The available evidence did not point towards renewed direct contact being required for the child’s welfare and, if anything, pointed against it. The appellant therefore had no Article 8 right on the facts of this case to remain pending the family proceedings.
6. The Court applied the appellate restraint described in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5; [2014] ETMR 26. There was ample evidence for the First-tier Tribunal’s findings and inferences. Its substantive dismissal of the Article 8 appeal was not challenged successfully, and no remission was appropriate. Any later evidence supporting leave should be presented in a fresh application to the respondent.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal on 28 April 2026 and refused permission to adduce new evidence.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) dismissed the appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on 19 February 2025.
• First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal against refusal of leave to remain, holding that Article 8 did not require the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom pending the family-court proceedings and that refusal of leave was compatible with Article 8.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department refused the appellant’s application for leave to remain as the parent of a British-national child.