Deutsche Bank AG v Alexander Vik

The court retains an inherent power to make a further order requiring examination where an order under CPR Part 71 was validly served within the jurisdiction but the required information was not provided. The Part 71 process remains extant until the information which the original order was designed to obtain has been supplied, so the person cannot defeat the process by resigning as an officer or leaving the jurisdiction. The proper question is whether the further order is just and convenient to make the original order effective and protect the integrity of the court’s processes. A prior choice to pursue contempt proceedings does not bar a further compliance order. The public interest in enforcing court orders carries significant weight when exercising the discretion.

Deutsche Bank obtained judgment against Sebastian Holdings Inc and a costs order against Mr Alexander Vik, who had been joined for costs purposes only. While Mr Vik was an officer of the company and present in England, the High Court made an order under CPR r.71.2(1)(b) requiring him to produce documents and attend an examination concerning the judgment debt. The order was personally served within the jurisdiction.

Mr Vik later ceased to be an officer and left the jurisdiction. He attended the examination but gave materially untruthful answers and withheld documents. Contempt proceedings followed. A suspended committal order requiring a further examination ultimately ceased to have effect, and the High Court dismissed Deutsche Bank’s subsequent application for a further examination, holding that the court lacked power and would not exercise it in any event: [2025] EWHC 283 (Comm). The issues were whether the Part 71 process remained extant, whether the court had power to order a further examination, whether that relief should be granted, and whether service on Mr Vik’s solicitors was valid.

1. Appeal allowed. The Part 71 process begun by personal service of the 2015 Order remained extant. Mr Vik’s obligations to provide truthful information had not been discharged by attending the examination on the specified date, answering questions untruthfully, or being released from the oath. The court therefore retained personal jurisdiction over him in respect of the subject matter of the order and matters incidental to it.
2. The court’s inherent power to enforce its orders includes power to make a further mandatory order requiring compliance with obligations that remain outstanding. The correct question was whether the order sought was just and convenient to make the CPR r.71.2 order effective or to protect its integrity. It was unnecessary to label the order ancillary or incidental, and the power did not conflict with CPR r.71.2 because the original process was continuing.
3. The fact that Mr Vik had left the jurisdiction or ceased to be an officer did not defeat the power. Nor did Deutsche Bank’s decision first to pursue contempt proceedings. A further order could repeat questions or information previously sought. Fresh breaches could in principle give rise to fresh contempt proceedings, although Mr Vik could not be punished again for the original lies. Any double-jeopardy issue would depend on the precise overlap and did not justify refusing relief at this stage.
4. The judge’s discretionary refusal was flawed. She failed to give sufficient weight to the public interest in enforcing court orders and maintaining the integrity of the court’s processes. Her assessment of futility rested partly on an erroneous assumption that a further order would lack coercive sanction and did not adequately explain departure from Moulder J’s assessment that a further examination might produce compliance. The Court of Appeal exercised the discretion afresh and ordered a further examination, with written submissions invited on its form.
5. Service on Brecher was valid. Mr Vik remained a defendant in the underlying claim, Brecher remained on the record with authority to accept documents about that claim, and the application notice was such a document. The court provisionally considered that an officer examined under Part 71 was probably not a “party” for CPR r.6.23 purposes, but expressly left that issue undecided. The objection to service of the Notice of Appeal also failed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed Deutsche Bank’s appeal against the High Court’s dismissal of its application for a further examination and exercised the discretion afresh.
• High Court (Commercial Court): Mrs Justice Cockerill dismissed the application, holding that the court lacked power to make the further examination order and that it would not have been appropriate to grant it: [2025] EWHC 283 (Comm).