Linda Hamer v Hesther Levy

Exact compliance with tenancy-deposit prescribed information is not invariably required. Information may satisfy the Housing Act 2004 if, read in context by a reasonable recipient, it is substantially to the same effect as the prescribed form and fulfils the statutory purpose of protecting deposits and facilitating dispute resolution. Minor errors in contact details, cross-references and non-prescribed dates, and an unsigned certificate, may therefore be immaterial. A later communication referring to the tenancy agreement may cure an earlier deficiency. Failure to provide a UK service address under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 does not prevent service of a section 21 notice. Before permission, an unmeritorious appeal should ordinarily be refused permission rather than struck out under CPR 52.18.

The respondent landlord granted the appellant an assured shorthold tenancy in October 2019 and protected the tenancy deposit. The prescribed information contained several errors, including an incorrect address, a one-digit telephone-number error, an incorrect deposit date and an unsigned certificate. In April 2024 the respondent’s solicitors referred the appellant to prescribed information in the tenancy agreement, before serving a new section 21 notice.

The County Court made a possession order on 5 August 2024. HH Judge Mitchell later struck out the appellant’s appeal against that order. Pepperall J held that the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appellant’s application in Hamer v Levy [2025] EWHC 3101 (KB). The appellant challenged the procedural fairness of the original hearing, the strike-out procedure and the validity of the section 21 notice. The central issues were whether the prescribed information was substantially compliant, whether the later letter cured any deficiency, and whether the procedural flaws required the possession order to be set aside.

Outcome. Baker LJ, with Lewis LJ agreeing, extended time, granted permission to appeal and dismissed the appeal.

1. Procedural fairness and strike-out. The district judge’s hearing was not wholly satisfactory. The appellant lacked the expected assistance of the housing duty officer and the hearing was listed for only 30 minutes. Nevertheless, the issues were ventilated and the substantive outcome was neither wrong nor unjust. HH Judge Mitchell should have dealt with permission under CPR rules 52.3 to 52.7. The power under CPR rule 52.18(1)(a) is ordinarily confined to cases after permission has been granted, such as failure to comply with court orders, and requires a compelling reason. Turner v Haworth Associates [2001] EWCA Civ 370 was distinguishable because it concerned an appeal brought before the relevant permission regime. Moses-Taiga v Oghenerume [2004] EWCA Civ 1399 and Kanabar v Kanabar [2026] EWCA Civ 582 illustrated the proper post-permission use of the power.
2. Prescribed information. The information had to be interpreted as a reasonable recipient would understand it in context, having regard to the statutory requirements and purpose. Exact compliance was unnecessary if the material was substantially to the same effect and achieved the purpose of safeguarding deposits and facilitating dispute resolution. The approach in Pease v Carter & Anor [2020] EWCA Civ 175, Mannai v Eagle [1997] AC 749 and Lowe v Governors of Sutton's Hospital in Charterhouse [2025] EWCA Civ 857 was applied.
3. Application. The incorrect clause reference and one-digit telephone error caused no material prejudice. The deposit date was not information prescribed by the 2007 Order. The absence of a signed certificate did not prevent substantial compliance. The solicitors’ letter of 12 April 2024 sufficiently referred the appellant to the prescribed information in the tenancy agreement, notwithstanding that the agreement pre-dated payment of the deposit. The section 21 notice was therefore valid. Section 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 did not alter that conclusion.
4. The procedural errors did not require a rehearing because the Court of Appeal had fully heard the substantive issues and the possession order would ultimately have been made. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was granted, time was extended, and the appeal was dismissed.
2. High Court: In Hamer v Levy [2025] EWHC 3101 (KB), Pepperall J held that the appeal from HH Judge Mitchell’s case-management decision lay to the Court of Appeal. The application to set aside the earlier order was dismissed, the stay was lifted and permission to appeal was refused.
3. County Court at Torquay and Newton Abbot: District Judge Priddis made a possession order on 5 August 2024. HH Judge Mitchell struck out the appellant’s appeal against that order on 6 November 2024.