Entry Clearance Officer v BB & Ors

For family life to exist under Article 8 between adult relatives, there must be additional elements of dependence beyond normal emotional ties. Real, committed or effective support may be relevant, but is not alone the governing test.

The Upper Tribunal may set aside a First-tier Tribunal decision only for a material error of law. It must exercise restraint when reviewing a specialist tribunal’s fact-sensitive evaluation. It cannot substitute its own assessment merely because it would have reached a different conclusion. A reasoned finding that adult family life was not re-established was open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence and had to be reinstated.

The respondents, Afghan nationals, sought entry clearance to join their relative in the United Kingdom. The sponsor had left Afghanistan as a young person and later obtained refugee status. The family had resumed regular remote contact after a period without contact, and the sponsor had significant mental-health conditions.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeals on 23 July 2024. It found that Article 8 family life had not been re-established between the adult sponsor and the respondents. The Upper Tribunal set that decision aside on 14 February 2025 and, on 27 August 2025, remade it by allowing the appeals on human-rights grounds.

The Entry Clearance Officer appealed. The central issue was whether the Upper Tribunal had been entitled to interfere with the First-tier Tribunal’s fact-sensitive conclusion on the existence of family life between adult relatives.

1. Appeal allowed. The Upper Tribunal was not entitled to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. Its subsequent remaking decision therefore could not stand, and the First-tier Tribunal’s dismissal of the respondents’ appeals was reinstated.

2. Under sections 11 and 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction is confined to errors of law. It must exercise judicial restraint when reviewing the First-tier Tribunal’s factual findings and evaluative judgment. It should not identify an error merely because it would have assessed the evidence differently, nor read the First-tier Tribunal’s reasons in a fragmented or overly textual way.

3. The First-tier Tribunal had asked whether the relationship involved real, effective or committed support rather than ordinary emotional ties. Reading its detailed reasons fairly and as a whole, it had undertaken that inquiry. It had not imposed an exceptional-circumstances threshold or failed to stand back and evaluate the evidence. Its finding that family life had not been re-established was reasonably open to it.

4. The court confirmed the approach in IA and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. Family life between adult parents and children, or adult siblings, requires additional elements of dependence beyond normal emotional ties. Exclusive or complete dependency is unnecessary, but dependence is more than support, even if the support is real, committed or effective. The earlier formulation drawn from Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 was more favourable to the respondents than the correct test. Any error by the First-tier Tribunal in applying it was thus immaterial to the respondents and could not justify interference.

5. Ground 1 succeeded. It was unnecessary to decide the remaining grounds concerning the Upper Tribunal’s own family-life finding or proportionality.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Entry Clearance Officer’s appeal and reinstated the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): On 14 February 2025, set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision for error of law. On 27 August 2025, remade the decision and allowed the respondents’ appeals on human-rights grounds.
• First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): On 23 July 2024, dismissed the respondents’ entry-clearance appeals, finding that Article 8 family life was not established.