Sohail Tasib, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Paragraph 14(f) of the Authority to Carry Scheme 2023 covers a foreign criminal while the Secretary of State is considering matters, including relevant exceptions, which form part of making that person subject to a deportation order. It does not apply only after a final decision to make the order.

A settled migrant who is temporarily abroad may remain within United Kingdom jurisdiction for Article 8 purposes where a statutory decision prevents return and affects established private and family life. A fact-specific proportionality challenge to a refusal of authority to carry is ordinarily reviewed on appeal, rather than assessed afresh. The Secretary of State may direct an immigration officer under Schedule 2 to cancel leave, but the direction letter does not itself alter immigration status.

The appellant, a Pakistani national with indefinite leave to remain, had lived in the United Kingdom since childhood. While temporarily visiting Pakistan, he was served at his United Kingdom address with a notice proposing deportation following serious criminal convictions. An airline was then refused authority to carry him to the United Kingdom under paragraph 14(f) of the Authority to Carry Scheme 2023.

On 13 June 2025 the Secretary of State directed that he be excluded and an immigration officer cancelled his indefinite leave to remain. Farbey J dismissed the judicial review challenge or refused permission on relevant grounds: [2026] EWHC 139 (Admin). The appeal concerned the construction of paragraph 14(f), Article 8, the alleged consequential historic injustice, and the power to issue the direction.

1. Appeal dismissed and judicial review claim dismissed. Paragraph 14(f) concerns the statutory process of making a person subject to a deportation order. For a foreign criminal, that process includes considering whether an exception under the UK Borders Act 2007 applies. It does not begin only after a final stage-2 decision to make the order. The appellant was therefore within paragraph 14(f) when authority to carry was refused.

2. The respondent’s late respondent’s notice was permitted. The Article 1 issue was a pure point of law, required no further evidence, and was fully argued. Applying R (Ali) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 372, the appellant was within United Kingdom jurisdiction when the refusal was made. He was a settled migrant, temporarily abroad, whose established United Kingdom family and private life was directly affected by a statutory decision preventing his return. R3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department was distinguishable.

3. The Court nevertheless upheld the judge’s conclusion that the temporary refusal of authority to carry was a proportionate interference with Article 8. Under Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, this fact-specific challenge called for appellate review, not a fresh proportionality assessment. The judge had properly weighed the appellant’s strong United Kingdom ties against serious drug and dangerous-driving offending and the public-safety risk pending consideration of his status.

4. The exclusion letter did not itself alter the appellant’s immigration status. Properly analysed, it notified a direction to an immigration officer to cancel leave. Paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 impliedly empowered the Secretary of State to give that direction. The Court did not decide the separate, prospective question concerning directions to entry-clearance officers.

5. As the authority-to-carry refusal was lawful, the alleged historic-injustice ground necessarily failed. The Court expressed no view on whether an unlawful refusal could amount to historic injustice.

Lewis LJ gave the principal judgment. Sir Nicholas Underhill and Peter Jackson LJ agreed. Sir Nicholas Underhill added that the Home Office’s delay and failure urgently to address the appellant’s post-refusal representations were seriously deficient, but did not render the refusal disproportionate.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal on the two permitted appeal grounds; granted permission to pursue two judicial-review grounds under CPR 52.8, retained them, and dismissed the claim.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Farbey J dismissed aspects of the claim and refused permission on others: [2026] EWHC 139 (Admin) .