R v Phillipe Dookhun

A guilty plea does not bar an appeal against conviction, but it presents a significant obstacle. The court must consider whether the conviction is safe and whether there is any arguable ground for granting leave.

An extension of time may be refused where the delay lacks a good explanation and the proposed appeal has no merit. Fresh evidence will not be admitted where there is no reasonable explanation for its absence at trial and it could not afford a ground for allowing the appeal. Complaints about legal advice or pressure to plead guilty require evidential support; contemporaneous records and the plea hearing may establish that the plea was informed and voluntary.

The applicant was convicted in the Crown Court at Canterbury on 23 November 2023, after pleading guilty to stalking and harassment. Two other counts were ordered to lie on the file. He was sentenced on 21 March 2024, and a separate appeal against sentence was refused by order dated 12 December 2024.

He later renewed an application for leave to appeal against conviction, filed 390 days out of time, and applied under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to adduce statements from his mother and aunt as fresh evidence. The single judge had refused the application on the papers. The central issues were whether time should be extended, whether the guilty pleas were vitiated, whether the proposed grounds disclosed any arguable challenge to the safety of the convictions, and whether the fresh evidence could properly be admitted.

1. The court refused the application for an extension of time and the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction. It also refused the application to adduce fresh evidence under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The matter was certified as totally without merit, with no further order.
2. The applicant gave no good explanation for the lengthy delay. Nevertheless, the court considered the merits because they were relevant to the decision whether to extend time. The proposed appeal was without merit and therefore an extension would serve no useful purpose.
3. A guilty plea is not an absolute bar to an appeal because the ultimate question is whether the conviction is safe. It is, however, a significant obstacle. The contemporaneous attendance notes, hearing records and advice given before the pleas showed that the applicant was fit to plead, understood the available choices, admitted relevant conduct and entered the pleas after appropriate advice. There was no evidential basis for concluding that the pleas were involuntary, coerced or otherwise vitiated.
4. The alleged connection between the conduct and pending divorce proceedings did not provide a defence to either offence. The applicant’s admissions and the prosecution evidence meant that the challenges to the stalking and harassment convictions disclosed no arguable ground. Counts 1 and 4 could not be challenged because there were no convictions on those counts, and matters relating to sentence were irrelevant to the present conviction appeal.
5. The proposed statements did not satisfy the requirements for admission as fresh evidence under section 23(2). There was no reasonable explanation why the witnesses had not been called below, and the evidence would not have afforded any ground for allowing the appeal.
6. The court endorsed the single judge’s conclusion that none of the grounds was arguable, still less sufficiently arguable to justify leave. The application was accordingly refused as totally without merit.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the single judge refused the application for leave to appeal against conviction on the papers. On renewal, the court refused an extension of time, leave to appeal and the application to adduce fresh evidence, and certified the matter as totally without merit.
2. Crown Court at Canterbury: on 23 November 2023 the applicant was convicted after pleading guilty to stalking and harassment; two further counts were ordered to lie on the file. On 21 March 2024 he was sentenced to 55 months’ imprisonment on the stalking count, with 12 weeks concurrent on the harassment count.
3. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): a separate appeal against sentence was refused by order dated 12 December 2024.