R v TPD

In sentencing for breach of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures notice, culpability is assessed by the nature of the deliberate breach of a known restriction. The offender’s reasons or mindset may mitigate sentence but do not alter culpability. The relevant intention is the intention to breach the restriction, not an intention to commit a further terrorist offence.

Where a notice has been issued and maintained, the sentencing court must treat the harm or risk of harm from breach as very serious. It cannot reassess the Secretary of State’s decision or the underlying open and closed intelligence. The absence of actual harm does not require movement to a lower harm category. A court may use the analogous guideline for breach of a Criminal Behaviour Order.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to four breaches of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures notice. He was sentenced to 27 months, comprising 15 months’ custody and a one-year special licence period, with the sentences concurrent. The judge also imposed a three-year Serious Crime Prevention Order.

He appealed against sentence and the order. The appeal raised the proper assessment of culpability and harm, the relevance of evidence of rehabilitation and mental disorder, mitigation, and the necessity and proportionality of the Serious Crime Prevention Order. The central issues were how a breach of a protective notice should be sentenced where no specific guideline exists and the scope of an appeal against a Serious Crime Prevention Order.

1. Appeal against sentence dismissed. The court granted leave because the appeal raised issues of general importance concerning sentencing for breach of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures notice, but found no sentencing error.
2. In the absence of an offence-specific guideline, the analogous guideline for breach of a Criminal Behaviour Order could properly be used. Culpability is assessed by the nature of the breach itself, ranging from a brief or isolated breach, or one close to reasonable excuse, to repeated or persistent offending. The culpability arises from deliberate breach of a known restriction. The offender’s reasons or mindset may provide mitigation, but cannot alter culpability. The relevant intention is intention to breach the restriction, not intention to commit a further terrorist offence.
3. Under sections 3 and 11 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, a notice may be issued and maintained only where the statutory conditions concerning protection from terrorism and prevention or restriction of terrorism-related activity continue to be met. The sentencing court does not have the open and closed material available to the Secretary of State or the High Court. It must therefore proceed on the basis that breach of any measure exposes the public to a risk of terrorist activity, making the harm caused or risked very serious.
4. The absence of actual harm does not require movement to a lower harm category. Protective-order breach guidelines address risk of harm and do not distinguish between actual harm and risk of harm in seriousness. Evidence from a theological intervention provider is relevant to the Secretary of State’s review, but does not alter the sentencing court’s assessment of harm or culpability.
5. The judge had adequately considered the psychological evidence, the appellant’s father’s terminal illness, progress in rehabilitation, and other mitigation. No reduction for age or immaturity was required. The sentence was below the guideline starting point despite aggravating factors.
6. The appeal against the Serious Crime Prevention Order was also dismissed. Under section 24(11) of the Serious Crime Act 2007 and article 4 of the Serious Crime Act (Appeals under s.24) Order 2008, the appeal was limited to review of the Crown Court’s decision. There was no procedural or other error, and the order was reasonable.

• Crown Court at Central Criminal Court: The appellant pleaded guilty to four breaches of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures notice and was sentenced on 2 October 2025 to 27 months, comprising 15 months’ custody and a one-year special licence period. A three-year Serious Crime Prevention Order was also imposed.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeals against sentence and the Serious Crime Prevention Order were dismissed. The court found no sentencing error and no procedural or other error in making the order.