R v Govinder Singh

On an Attorney General’s Reference, a sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the range that a judge, applying all relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate. The sentencing judge is especially well placed to assess competing considerations, and leniency is not itself an error. Where several offences arise from one episode, totality requires a principled and proportionate uplift to reflect the additional criminality. The court must not simply aggregate concurrent sentences, but must explain how the separate offending affects the overall sentence. An uplift which fails to reflect materially distinct offences and their combined aggravating features may render the sentence unduly lenient.

The Crown Court at Leicester sentenced Govinder Singh after his guilty pleas to two counts of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and one count of wounding with intent, each contrary to Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The principal sentence was seven years and six months’ imprisonment, with concurrent sentences of five years and three months and three years and nine months on the other counts.

The Attorney General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that the judge had failed to apply totality adequately and had treated the case essentially as a single offence. The central issue was whether the uplift allowed for the additional counts sufficiently reflected the overall criminality.

1. Reference allowed in part. The court granted leave and held that the sentence was unduly lenient. The applicable test was whether the sentence fell outside the range which a judge, applying his or her mind to all relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate. The sentencing judge was particularly well placed to assess competing considerations, and leniency alone was not a vice.
2. The sentencing categorisation was not challenged. The first count involved culpability category A and harm category 2, while the third count involved harm category 3. The judge had taken account of significant aggravating features, including the attack on pedestrians, vulnerable victims, children present, departure without assistance, further assaults, and an attempt to mislead the police. There were also substantial mitigating features, including remorse, ten years without offending, good character, progress in prison and the effect on the offender’s children.
3. The sentencing remarks did not make clear what uplift had been applied for the second and third counts. The court inferred that only about one year had been added beyond the sentence for the principal count. That was plainly insufficient to reflect the separate offences and the criminality involved. The uplift was therefore unduly lenient.
4. The court recalculated the sentence. For count 1 alone, the appropriate sentence was nine years after mitigation and six years and nine months after the 25 per cent guilty-plea discount. The sentences for counts 2 and 3 could not simply be added. Totality instead required a principled and proportionate increase, assessed at three years and three months. The sentence on count 1 was therefore increased to ten years, with the other sentences remaining concurrent.
5. The driving-disqualification extension was increased from five years to 80 months, being two-thirds of the ten-year sentence.

• Crown Court at Leicester: On 7 November 2025, Mr Recorder Stacey sentenced the respondent to seven years and six months’ imprisonment on count 1, with concurrent sentences of five years and three months and three years and nine months on counts 2 and 3.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the sentence on count 1 was increased to ten years. Counts 2 and 3 remained concurrent, and the disqualification extension was increased to 80 months.