R v Matteo Bottarelli

In an attempted murder case involving voluntary intoxication, a specific intoxication direction is required where the evidence realistically raises an issue whether the defendant formed the necessary intent, regardless of the defence advanced. The direction should explain that an intoxicated intent remains an intent, while requiring the jury to consider all the evidence, including intoxication, in deciding whether the prosecution has proved the requisite intent. The issue may be neutralised by clear admissions that the defendant knew what he was doing and had formed an intention to cause serious harm, where there is no real evidence of inability to form the intent to kill. Even if a specific direction was warranted, its omission does not automatically make a conviction unsafe; safety depends on the evidence, the issues, and the directions as a whole.

The appellant was convicted in the Crown Court at Wood Green of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent and two counts of attempted murder, following attacks on three co-workers with a mattock and a scalpel after consuming heroin and crack cocaine. He had pleaded guilty to alternative counts of wounding with intent and accepted in his Defence Statements that he intended to cause serious or really serious harm to two victims, while denying an intention to kill.

He appealed against conviction, arguing that the judge had failed to direct the jury adequately on voluntary intoxication and specific intent. He also sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against his 30-year sentence. The central issues were whether intoxication remained a live issue on the evidence and, if so, whether the omission made the convictions unsafe.

1. Conviction appeal dismissed. The court adopted the analysis in R v Aidid [2021] EWCA Crim 581. A specific direction on voluntary intoxication is clearly necessary where the defendant’s case is that intoxication made him incapable of forming the necessary intent. It will normally also be required where there is sufficient, realistically viewed evidence of alcohol or drug consumption to make it a potential issue as to whether the specific intent was formed, regardless of the defence advanced. The jury must be told that an intoxicated intent is nevertheless an intent and must consider all the evidence, including intoxication, in deciding whether the requisite intent is proved.
2. This case was materially different. The appellant had admitted, by his guilty pleas and Defence Statements, that he knew what he was doing and intended to cause really serious harm. The issue was whether he intended to kill, not whether he could form an intention. There was no real evidence of inability to form the intent required for attempted murder. The court rejected the suggested distinction between capacity to intend grievous bodily harm and capacity to intend to kill.
3. It was therefore unnecessary for the trial judge to refer specifically to intoxication in directing the jury on intention. The judge had directed the jury to examine the whole evidence, including the appellant’s conduct and words before, during and after the attacks. The jury’s question about drug addiction and intent showed that intoxication was in their minds, and the judge’s answer that a drug-induced intention was an intention was not shown to be inadequate.
4. Even if a specific direction ought to have been given, its omission alone would not render the convictions unsafe. The consequence depended on the evidence, issues and directions as a whole. The nature of the attacks, the appellant’s admissions, and the directions given supported the safety of the convictions.
5. Sentence application. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against the 30-year sentence was refused. The sentences of “no separate penalty” on the alternative counts were quashed, and those offences were ordered to lie on the file, following R v Butler [2023] EWCA Crim 676.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The conviction appeal was dismissed. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence was refused. Leave was granted only in relation to counts 4 and 6; the sentences of “no separate penalty” were quashed and those offences were ordered to lie on the file.
• Crown Court at Wood Green: The appellant was convicted on 21 February 2024 and sentenced on 30 April 2024 to 30 years’ imprisonment. The Crown Court had entered “no separate penalty” on the alternative wounding-with-intent counts.