R v Steven New

In a delayed application to appeal a criminal conviction, the Court of Appeal held that a trial judge need not give every possible additional direction where the jury received adequate guidance and the issues were clear. An omission concerning distress or particular prejudice from delay does not make a conviction unsafe without material unfairness. Trial advocates are entitled to make tactical decisions. The court will intervene only where representation was flagrantly incompetent in a way that affects the safety of the conviction. Fresh evidence must be capable of belief, admissible at trial and capable of affording a ground for allowing the appeal under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Evidence that merely duplicates matters already before the jury will not satisfy that test. Separate meritless grounds do not become arguable cumulatively.

The applicant was convicted by a jury at the Crown Court at Gloucester on 12 October 2022 of historic sexual offences involving two complainants, referred to as C1 and C2. He was sentenced on 1 February 2023 to 40 months’ imprisonment, with consequential sexual-offence orders.

He applied for an extension of 730 days and permission to appeal his convictions. The nine grounds challenged the judge’s directions and summing-up, the conduct of the trial advocate, and the failure to call additional defence and character witnesses. The central issues were whether any ground was arguable, whether the proposed fresh evidence could support an appeal, and whether the convictions were unsafe.

The court refused both the application for an extension of time and permission to appeal.

1. The omission of a specific direction concerning C1’s distress when making a complaint was undesirable, but did not amount to a misdirection or affect safety. The complaint was made many years after the alleged offending and the distress was modest.
2. The delay direction was conventional and appropriate. The absence of specific examples of prejudice, or a further reminder of the burden and standard of proof, was not critical because the jury had been directed about the difficulties caused by delay and repeatedly reminded of the applicable burden and standard.
3. The good-character direction was adequate. The jury received both credibility and propensity directions and knew of the applicant’s positive good character. Further character evidence was not required to make the trial fair.
4. No additional direction was needed about the disadvantages of intermediary-assisted cross-examination. The judge explained the process, and the applicant’s denial of the allegations had been put sufficiently clearly. Any inconsistency or mistake in questioning did not obscure the issues for the jury.
5. Trial counsel was entitled to make tactical decisions about which inconsistencies to pursue and which witnesses to call. The Court of Appeal would intervene only if the representation was flagrantly incompetent so as to affect the safety of the conviction. That threshold was not met.
6. Under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the proposed evidence from the applicant’s brothers was capable of belief and admissible at trial, but could not afford a ground for allowing the appeal. It merely showed that they had not observed offending and added little to evidence already heard by the jury.
7. The court considered the complaints both individually and cumulatively. Adding grounds that lacked merit did not create an arguable basis for challenging safe convictions. The applications were therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 13 March 2026, refused the application for an extension of time and permission to appeal.
• Crown Court at Gloucester: The applicant was convicted on 12 October 2022 and sentenced on 1 February 2023 to 40 months’ imprisonment, with consequential orders.