R v Matthew Hargreaves

On an application by an affected third party under section 42(3)(b) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to vary or discharge a restraint order, the Crown Court is not obliged to decide the contested existence or extent of a tainted gift. A restraint order is a holding order and may be imposed or maintained on the basis of a good arguable case. The statutory requirement to act with a view to realising no more than the value of a tainted gift is compatible with deferring the dispute to enforcement. The court may choose enforcement as the appropriate stage where practical arrangements preserve the third party’s opportunity to contest the issue. Renewed leave to appeal refused.

Holly Hargreaves renewed an application for leave to appeal against the Crown Court at Merthyr Tydfil’s refusal on 23 September 2024 to vary or discharge restraint orders made on 25 September 2014. The orders restricted dealings with three investment properties registered jointly in her name and that of her husband, Matthew Hargreaves.

In confiscation proceedings against Matthew Hargreaves, the Crown Court had included the full value of the properties in the available amount and had found that the applicant’s interests derived from tainted gifts. That finding was not binding against her. She accepted a tainted gift of approximately £10,250 but disputed any greater amount. The Crown Court declined to determine the dispute on the variation application and held that enforcement was the appropriate stage. The central issue was whether that deferral was legally permissible.

The renewed application for leave to appeal was refused. The proposed appeal had no realistic prospect of success, and no other compelling reason to hear it was advanced.

1. No entitlement to an immediate merits determination. The court held that an application under section 42(3)(b) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 could be determined on its merits without deciding the underlying contested question about the existence or extent of a tainted gift. Sections 41(1) and 83(b) did not make such a determination a precondition to imposing or maintaining restraint.
2. Nature and threshold of restraint. A restraint order is a holding order. It may initially be imposed, or maintained at a return hearing involving an affected person, on the basis of a good arguable case. The statutory steer in section 69, including the requirement to realise no more than the value of a tainted gift, looks to the ultimate enforcement stage and does not require the court to resolve every controversial issue at the restraint stage. The court applied the approach in Crown Prosecution Service v Compton [2002] EWCA Civ 1720.
3. Discretion and enforcement. The Judge was entitled, in the circumstances, to regard enforcement as the appropriate stage for decisive resolution. The agreed undertaking to seek an enforcement receiver provided a practical trigger and avoided open-ended limbo. The applicant would have an opportunity to contest the tainted-gift issues before confiscation was enforced against her interests. The case-management reasoning recognised in R v Hilton [2020] UKSC 29 was apposite.
4. Alternative argument. The proposed complaint that there was no good arguable case had not been raised before the Judge or included in the grounds or skeleton argument. It was therefore not a viable or fair criticism on the renewed application.

The applicant was ordered to pay Powys County Council’s costs, assessed by the court at £22,000 under section 89(4)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): on 10 February 2026, the renewed application for leave to appeal was refused. The applicant was ordered to pay £22,000 in costs.
• Divisional Court: a case-stated judgment recording part of the procedural history is reported at [2022] EWHC 3176 (Admin).
• Crown Court at Merthyr Tydfil: on 23 September 2024, the application to vary or discharge the restraint orders was refused. The court left the tainted-gift dispute to the enforcement stage.