Rosa Hicks & Ors v R

A jury’s internet research does not automatically make a conviction unsafe. The appellate court must examine the material and assess its effect on trial fairness and conviction safety. Actual prejudice to an individual juror need not be proved where bias is alleged. The question is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the relevant circumstances, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The rule against jurors researching a case protects open justice and the parties’ opportunity to address material considered by the jury, whether before or after retirement. Fresh evidence may be received where it may afford a ground for allowing an appeal, but the appeal fails if the evidence ultimately does not show that the conviction is unsafe. Reasonable inferences may be drawn, but speculation cannot establish prejudice.

Five appellants were convicted by a majority of 11 to 1 at the Crown Court at Isleworth of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance, contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. They applied for leave to appeal against conviction on six grounds. Four grounds concerned trial management, police conduct, media coverage and directions concerning the climate emergency. The principal ground concerned fresh evidence that Juror 5 had researched the case online during jury deliberations and had discussed some information with other jurors. The police investigation examined only one of four electronic devices, giving rise to an argument that further prejudicial material might have been found. The central issues were whether the fresh evidence should be admitted and whether the known or possible undiscovered research rendered the convictions unsafe.

The court refused leave on Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6. It granted leave on Ground 1 and received the fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, but dismissed the appeals.

1. Other grounds. The case-management decision to begin the trial after a one-week adjournment caused financial loss but did not arguably affect the safety of the convictions. The trial judge was entitled to deal with the police arrest witnessed by jurors through enquiry and directions rather than discharging the jury. Her directions concerning closing submissions and the climate emergency were careful, fair and legally adequate.
2. Extraneous jury material. The principles identified in R v Karakaya [2005] EWCA Crim 346 protect open justice and the parties’ fair opportunity to address material considered by the jury. Under R v Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 1623, the introduction of extraneous material is an irregularity, but there is no automatic rule requiring a conviction to be quashed. The court must examine the material and determine whether it affected trial fairness or conviction safety. R v Stuttle [2025] EWCA Crim 256 did not establish a contrary absolute rule.
3. Bias and uncertainty. Actual prejudice to a juror need not be proved. The relevant question, applying Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357, was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would see a real possibility of jury bias. The court considered all relevant circumstances. It applied the approach in Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (in liquidation) v HNA Group Co Ltd (Liberty intervening) [2020] UKSC 34: reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, but a mere possibility cannot support speculation. The proposed analogy with Armory v Delamirie (1721) 93 ER 66 was rejected because police liability for wrongdoing was not in issue.
4. Application. The known searches concerned matters already in evidence or material consistent with the defence case. They did not give rise to a real possibility that Juror 5 was biased. Although the possibility of further searches and the incompleteness of the police investigation were accepted, the evidence did not justify inferring that undiscovered material would have affected the verdicts. The convictions therefore remained safe.

All applications and appeals were dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave was refused on Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6. Leave was granted on Ground 1, fresh evidence was received under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, and the appeals were dismissed.
• Crown Court at Isleworth: The appellants were convicted on 20 March 2025 by a majority of 11 to 1 and sentenced on 16 May 2025.