R v Ricky Sani Riberio

When sentencing for later offences after an offender has received an earlier sentence, the later sentencing court must treat the earlier sentence as correct unless it has been referred to the Court of Appeal as unduly lenient. It must not effectively resentence the offender for the earlier offending. The court should determine a just and proportionate sentence for the later offences, taking proper account of the sentence already imposed. Where consecutive sentences are required, totality ordinarily calls for a downward adjustment, particularly where the offences are closely associated in time and type. Early-release provisions should ordinarily be left out of account when fixing the sentence.

The appellant had previously received a sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment for operating one Class A drugs line. While on bail, he operated a second line and was later sentenced for those offences by a different Crown Court judge. The judge criticised the earlier sentence, calculated a notional sentence for both sets of offences, deducted the earlier sentence, and imposed 38 months for the later offending. The sentence took practical effect consecutively to the earlier term.

The appellant argued that this approach breached totality and effectively increased an unchallenged sentence. The central issue was how the later court should sentence where the offences were separate but would probably have attracted concurrent sentences if dealt with together.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The sentences of 3 years and 2 months’ imprisonment were quashed and reduced to 2 years’ imprisonment on each count, concurrent.
2. Under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, an earlier sentence can be challenged as unduly lenient only through a reference to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney General. Where no such reference has been made, the later sentencing court must proceed on the footing that the earlier sentence was correct. It cannot treat that sentence as unduly lenient.
3. The judge therefore erred by deciding what he considered the correct sentence for both matters and deducting the earlier sentence. That approach effectively resentenced the appellant for the earlier offending and bypassed the protections applicable before an existing sentence can be increased.
4. The correct approach was to determine the sentence that was just and proportionate for the later offending, taking proper account of the sentence already imposed. The court considered R v Thompson [2012] EWCA Crim 1764, but held that it would be undesirable to predict what the earlier judge would have done had all matters been before that judge.
5. The later offences fell within category 3 with a significant role under the definitive drugs guideline. Offending on bail for similar offences and offering two Class A drugs justified a notional post-trial sentence of about 5 years and 4 months. After 25% credit for the guilty plea, the sentence before totality adjustment was 4 years.
6. Totality required a very considerable reduction because the two sets of offences were closely associated in time and type. The appropriate sentence for the later offending was 24 months. The court explained through R v Pidgeon [2017] EWCA Crim 538 and Patel [2021] EWCA Crim 231 that early-release and licence provisions should ordinarily be left out of account when fixing sentence.

• Crown Court at Southwark: HHJ Weekes sentenced the appellant on 12 June 2025 to concurrent terms of 3 years and 2 months’ imprisonment for two counts of being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug of class A.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court allowed the appeal to the extent stated and reduced each sentence to 2 years’ imprisonment, concurrent.