GVH, R (on the application of) v Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board

Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. Where a statutory complaints procedure offers redress conveniently and effectively, permission should ordinarily be refused unless exceptional circumstances justify judicial review. The existence of an alternative remedy concerns the court’s discretion, not its jurisdiction.

A Tameside challenge requires the omitted information to be sufficiently important that its absence renders the decision irrational. The court should not intervene merely because further inquiries would have been sensible or desirable. Permission will be refused where the pleaded grounds have no realistic prospect of success.

The claimant, a severely disabled 17-year-old, sought permission to challenge a decision by the defendant’s continuing-care panel reducing his funded care package from 56 to 32 hours per week.

The claimant alleged failures to investigate relevant respiratory evidence, errors concerning catheter-suction training, failure to make a holistic assessment of interrelated night-time needs, and failure to consider the health needs of other family members. The defendant relied on its statutory complaints procedure as an adequate alternative remedy and disputed the arguability of each ground.

The court therefore considered whether permission should be refused for failure to use the complaints procedure and, alternatively, whether any ground had a realistic prospect of success.

1. Alternative remedy. The statutory complaints procedure under the Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009 provided an effective mechanism for redress. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort where no other suitable procedure exists. The delay in supplying a decision summary and the absence of a response to a reconsideration request did not establish that the complaints process would be ineffective or unduly protracted.
2. The complaints process could provide more effective redress than a quashing order by permitting speedy, informal and inexpensive resolution. The existence of an alternative remedy affected the exercise of discretion, not jurisdiction. This was not an exceptional case warranting permission despite the available remedy.
3. Arguability. Ground One was not supported by the records, which showed that the panel considered six months of records as well as an additional ten-day period. The reformulated complaint that the evidence had not been considered carefully enough had not been pleaded or amended and, in any event, was not realistically Wednesbury unreasonable.
4. Ground Two did not meet the permission threshold. The four instances of catheter suctioning were undertaken by the claimant’s mother, and only two deployed staff members were trained. The panel chair’s evidence established that the number of trained staff was not central to the decision. Under Tameside, omitted information must be sufficiently important that its absence renders the decision irrational.
5. Grounds Three and Four had no reasonable prospects. The decision, read as a whole, assessed the claimant’s condition holistically and considered night-time positioning. The conclusion that manual handling was not an unmet health need could not realistically be characterised as Wednesbury unreasonable.
6. Ground Five failed for the same reason as Ground Two. The alleged failure to inquire into family members’ health needs was not information central to the decision. A court should intervene only where no reasonable authority could have been satisfied that its inquiries provided the information necessary for the decision.
7. Permission for judicial review was refused.

First-instance application for permission to bring judicial review. Permission was refused by the High Court (Administrative Court).