Ruben Giles & Ors v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

A challenge to the procedure selected for a planning appeal must ordinarily be brought promptly by judicial review when that procedural decision is made. It cannot generally be raised later through a statutory review of the final planning decision.

An inspector is entitled to decide an appeal on the evidence submitted by the parties. A further inquiry is required only in exceptional circumstances where fairness demands it. A planning condition requiring works on land outside the applicant’s control may fail the tests of reasonableness and enforceability, particularly where there is no evidence that the necessary third-party agreement can be obtained.

The claimants sought statutory review under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, and permission for statutory appeals under section 289. The proceedings challenged an inspector’s dismissal of an appeal against refusal of retrospective planning permission for an eleven-pitch gypsy and traveller site and related appeals against an enforcement notice.

The principal issues were whether the appeals had unlawfully been changed from a public inquiry to written representations, whether the inspector should have considered a condition or legal agreement securing highway visibility splays over neighbouring land, and whether the procedure breached Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention or the public sector equality duty.

1. Outcome. The section 288 claim and the section 289 applications failed. The inspector’s decision was not quashed and permission to appeal was refused.
2. Mode of appeal. A challenge to the choice between a public inquiry, hearing and written representations must be made by judicial review when that choice is made. Section 284 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 excludes judicial review for matters within section 288, but matters outside the statutory review are challengeable only by judicial review. The claimants had not challenged the procedural decision and had subsequently agreed to proceed by written representations. In any event, the decision was rational and consistent with the published criteria because the issues were understood from the documents, were not complex, and did not require oral testing of evidence.
3. Further inquiry and highway condition. An inspector may make further inquiries, but fairness requires that course only exceptionally. The highway visibility issue was central, known to both parties, and addressed in the claimants’ evidence. The inspector was entitled to proceed on the material submitted. A condition securing visibility over land outside the claimants’ ownership or control was not appropriate on the evidence, and there was no obligation to investigate whether an easement or other agreement might later be obtained.
4. Convention and equality rights. The written procedure gave the claimants a fair opportunity to present their case. The interference with Article 8 rights was lawful, pursued legitimate aims including highway safety and protection of the countryside and biodiversity, and was proportionate. The inspector was aware of and complied with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

The proceedings concerned a statutory review under section 288 and applications for permission to bring statutory appeals under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Both challenges to the inspector’s decision dated 19 September 2025 failed.