Lynsay Watson, R (on the application of) v The Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Constabulary

Third-party reporting of an alleged offence does not ordinarily give a person sufficient interest to challenge the police decision, unless the decision directly affects that person’s legal rights or exceptional circumstances justify standing. A person who is not the subject of the alleged conduct is not a victim for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 without an adequate basis for acting on the affected person’s behalf.

Police decisions not to investigate further are subject to a restrained judicial review. The court must respect the Chief Constable’s discretion and must not substitute its own assessment. Political expression receives enhanced protection, and communications must be truly grossly offensive before the relevant criminal threshold is met.

The claimant sought renewed permission to judicially review the Chief Constable’s decision of 20 March 2025 to take no further action on a complaint concerning tweets posted by Helen Joyce about Freda Wallace.

An earlier Deputy High Court Judge had refused disclosure of a letter from six individuals and refused permission. The claimant renewed both applications. She alleged failures to investigate, offences under the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Communications Act 2003 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, breaches of Articles 2, 8, 10 and 14 ECHR, procedural unfairness and breaches of the Victim’s Code. The central issues were standing, the lawfulness of the police assessment and whether further investigation was arguably required.

1. Disclosure. The renewed disclosure application was refused. The letter was not before the earlier judge and had no material relevance. A separate appeal was the proper route to challenge the earlier case-management decision.
2. Standing. The claimant was not the subject of the tweets, had produced no evidence that Wallace authorised her to act, and had no legal rights or obligations directly affected by the police decision. Her general interest as a transgender woman was insufficient and no exceptional circumstances justified standing. She was not a victim for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
3. Police discretion. The court reviews a Chief Constable’s decision not to investigate further or prosecute sparingly, respecting the available margin of discretion: [2007] QB 727. Judicial review does not permit substitution of the court’s view for that of the decision-maker.
4. Communications. The police were reasonably entitled to conclude that the tweets, although insensitive and provocative, did not meet the high threshold for grossly offensive communications under section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 or section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. The tweets formed part of a politically controversial public debate, engaging enhanced protection for political speech. Further investigation was not arguably irrational.
5. Harassment and human rights grounds. The police were entitled to conclude that there was no evidence of direct contact, incitement or targeted behaviour sufficient to establish a course of conduct amounting to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The decision was reasoned, lawful, rational and proportionate. Permission was refused, and the claimant was ordered to pay £4,020 costs unless she objected within 14 days.

The judgment itself records an earlier refusal of disclosure and permission by Andrew Kinnier KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 16 October 2025. The renewed applications were refused by the Administrative Court.