Blackpool Borough Council v Langley and Ors (No.3) (Publication of Judgments)

Publication of a judgment in private family proceedings engages both the court’s inherent jurisdiction and the principle of open justice. The court must identify the domestic cause of action supporting publication or restriction, then act compatibly with Convention rights. Any restriction on freedom of expression requires convincing, clear and cogent justification and must be proportionate to a legitimate aim.

In assessing harm to a child, the court must rely on the evidence in the individual case rather than presume that publicity is inevitably harmful. Existing public-domain information is relevant but not automatically decisive. Anonymisation may be limited where it would make the judgment unintelligible, prevent accurate reporting of matters of public interest, or artificially sever linked family and criminal proceedings.

The court considered whether its fact-finding judgment, judgment reopening earlier findings, and the present judgment should be anonymised before publication, and whether an existing Transparency Order should be varied.

The mother sought anonymisation of her name, her HIV-positive status, the child’s name, the local authority’s name and the hospital’s name. The other parties supported publication subject principally to anonymising the child and her father. The application arose against extensive national reporting of the mother’s criminal trial, which ended when the prosecution offered no evidence and her acquittal was directed. The central issue was how to reconcile the child’s and mother’s privacy rights with freedom of expression, open justice and the public interest in accurate reporting.

1. Jurisdiction and statutory framework. Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 restricts publication of information relating to proceedings in private and continues after proceedings end. Section 97 of the Children Act 1989 provides a parallel prohibition while proceedings concerning the child continue. A Transparency Order under FPR PD12R may vary the practical effect of those restrictions.
2. Following Abassi and another v Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Foundation Trust, Haastrup v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15, section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not itself create a cause of action for regulating publication. The court may rely on its inherent jurisdiction, including its parens patriae jurisdiction to protect a child’s welfare and rights, and its inherent jurisdiction to control publication from its own proceedings.
3. The court must begin with domestic law and ask whether intervention is necessary to safeguard the child, protect the child’s rights or ensure the administration of justice. It must then consider the engaged Convention rights. The structured approach requires consideration of whether the interference is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society. Restrictions on freedom of expression require convincing justification, particularly where reporting concerns matters of public interest.
4. In the protective parens patriae jurisdiction, the child’s best interests are a primary consideration but are not paramount. The effect of publicity must be assessed on the evidence in the individual case. A general assumption that publicity will inevitably harm a child is insufficient.
5. Publication of the judgments served substantial public interests. It would permit accurate reporting of the differing outcomes in the family and criminal proceedings, the treatment of expert evidence, and the operation of the family justice system. The mother’s name was already widely available and anonymising it would not materially protect the child, while preventing the press from explaining the relationship between the proceedings.
6. The mother’s HIV status was private and confidential. Nevertheless, she had relied on that status and the administration of antiretroviral medication as part of her explanation for the child’s injuries. The information was therefore necessary to make the court’s reasoning intelligible and to permit accurate debate on a matter of public interest. In the particular circumstances, the Article 8 rights of the mother and child yielded to Article 10.
7. The judgments were ordered to be published with only the child’s name and the father’s name anonymised. The local authority’s name, the hospital’s name, the mother’s name and the mother’s HIV-positive status were not to be anonymised. The Transparency Order was to be varied consistently with that decision, and the parties were invited to make submissions on timing.