Dr Michael Mew v The General Dental Council

An appeal under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 is by way of rehearing, but the appellate court must give the lower tribunal the degree of respect warranted by the nature of the decision. Findings based on credibility attract substantial deference. Evaluative conclusions receive meaningful, though potentially lesser, deference. The appellate court may intervene where the tribunal was wrong or where serious procedural irregularity made the decision unjust.

A professional tribunal may prefer one body of expert evidence after weighing expertise, independence, experience and the evidence as a whole. It need not define an abstract threshold of adequate objective evidence where the evidence plainly falls short in the circumstances. Untested internet material and expert opinion gathered outside the evidence cannot ordinarily be used to establish the relevant professional standard.

Dr Michael Mew appealed under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against a Professional Conduct Committee determination dated 6 November 2024. The PCC found that his treatment of two children and claims about Orthotropic treatment were inappropriate or misleading, amounted to misconduct, impaired his fitness to practise and justified erasure from the Dentists’ Register.

The appeal challenged the PCC’s treatment of competing expert evidence, its findings on particular charges, its findings of misconduct and impairment, its sanction, and the exclusion of open-source internet material. The appellant also sought to adduce fresh evidence. The central issue was whether the PCC’s determination was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to establish under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 and CPR 52.21(3) that the PCC’s determination was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.
2. The appeal was a rehearing rather than a supervisory review, but that did not permit the court to start afresh without regard to the PCC’s decision. Deference was a matter of degree. Primary findings based on witness credibility attracted strong respect. The court had somewhat greater latitude in reviewing evaluative and inferential conclusions, but still had to give meaningful weight to the PCC’s professional expertise, its observation of the witnesses and its extensive assessment of the evidence.
3. The PCC was entitled to prefer the GDC experts where their skill, experience, professional relevance and familiarity with UK regulatory duties outweighed criticisms of their evidence. It was also entitled to accept parts of the appellant’s experts’ evidence. The PCC’s reasoning did not show a blanket or uncritical preference.
4. The PCC was not required to formulate a precise definition of adequate objective evidence. The appellant had conceded the absence of such evidence, and the evidence fell short on any reasonable conception of adequacy given the demanding treatment, recognised risks and breadth of the claims made. The findings did not depend on a conclusion that randomised controlled trials were the only acceptable evidence.
5. The PCC was entitled to exclude internet searches and prevent cross-examination upon them. The material was untested, of uncertain authority and included opinion evidence not given by experts in the proceedings. The court considered the concerns expressed in Myhill v GDC [2025] EWHC 474 (Admin) to be consistent with that conclusion.
6. The fresh evidence application was considered notionally for costs purposes. Applying the three-stage approach in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745, the Harvey Thesis satisfied reasonable diligence and was just credible, but would not probably have influenced the result. The Interpretation Guide failed reasonable diligence and also lacked material influence. The application would have been refused.
7. The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s appeal costs, summarily assessed at £75,000 inclusive of VAT, payable by 4pm on 12 June 2026.

The judgment describes an appeal to the High Court under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 from the Professional Conduct Committee’s determination dated 6 November 2024. The appeal was dismissed and the PCC’s determination was upheld.