Grzegorz Przybys, R (on the application of) v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

A police decision not to investigate an alleged offence is subject to judicial review only in a wholly exceptional case. The discretion is broad, particularly where investigation would require substantial resources and specialist expertise. In allegations of gross negligence manslaughter arising from medical treatment, very serious mistakes or errors of judgment will not ordinarily approach the exceptionally high criminal threshold. It is rational for the police to await the views of an expert regulator or coroner before opening a complex investigation, provided the decision remains open to reconsideration if new information emerges. Such an approach is an exercise of the police’s own investigative discretion, rather than an unlawful delegation of it.

The claimant alleged that inadequate hospital treatment caused his mother’s death and reported suspected gross negligence manslaughter to the defendant Chief Constable. The police declined to investigate, directing him to pursue the matter with the General Medical Council. The coroner had treated the death as natural and had not sought police involvement. The claimant later challenged the decision by judicial review.

Permission was granted on two grounds: that the defendant had failed promptly to investigate the report, and that the decision not to investigate was irrational. The court also considered, although outside the permission granted, the claimant’s complaint that the allegation should have been recorded as a crime.

1. The claim was dismissed. The defendant had decided not to open an investigation, rather than closing an existing investigation. The decision was therefore assessed as an exercise of the broad discretion of an independent investigator.
2. The court applied the principle in R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 756, that only a highly exceptional case will justify judicial review of a decision not to investigate or prosecute. The same stringent approach was reflected in R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin), [2007] QB 727.
3. Gross negligence manslaughter requires the elements identified in R (Smith) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] EWHC 2032 (Admin), including a breach that creates an obvious and serious risk of death, causes the death, and is truly exceptionally bad and reprehensible so as to warrant criminal sanction. In the medical context, even very serious mistakes or errors of judgment will ordinarily fall far short. The court applied the principle stated in R v Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375.
4. It was rational for the defendant to await the GMC’s assessment, given its specialist expertise, the absence of concern from the coroner, the rarity of gross negligence manslaughter prosecutions following medical treatment, and the competing demands on police resources. The decision left open reconsideration if the GMC or other information indicated possible criminal conduct. That was not an unlawful delegation.
5. The complaint that the crime should have been recorded fell outside the permission granted. In any event, the relevant recording conditions had not occurred. The promptness ground also failed because the defendant responded within days of the report.

The judgment itself records that permission for judicial review was granted by HHJ Sephton KC on two grounds and that Hill J later confirmed that the full hearing was confined to those grounds. The claim was then determined at first instance by Mr Justice Coppel.