Ronald Whelan v Court of Appeal in Paris, France

Permission to appeal an extradition order should be refused where the proposed ground is not reasonably arguable. On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, the question is whether the extradition judge reached a legally wrong answer, including by giving crucial factors materially inadequate weight. Weight is ordinarily for the first-instance judge, and an appellate court should not substitute its own assessment without an arguable error.

In an Article 3 prison-conditions challenge, the presumption that a Convention state will comply with its obligations may be rebutted only by clear, cogent and compelling evidence demonstrating a real risk of prohibited treatment. General overcrowding statistics are no more than an indicator of individual personal space. They do not, without reliable prison-specific evidence, establish an Article 3 risk.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against District Judge Leong’s order of 27 June 2025 directing his extradition to France to serve a six-year sentence imposed following conviction in his absence. The renewed application concerned only compatibility with article 3 of the ECHR, particularly prison conditions at Bois d’Arcy, Nanterre and potentially Fresnes.

Permission had been refused on the papers by Collins-Rice J, who also refused applications to adduce further evidence. At the oral renewal hearing the applicant sought to rely on updated overcrowding statistics and a 2026 CPT report. The central issue was whether the District Judge had arguably erred in assessing the reports of the French national preventive mechanism and in concluding that the presumption of compliance had not been rebutted.

1. Disposition. Permission to appeal was refused. The single proposed ground was not reasonably arguable under Crim PR r. 50.17(4)(b).
2. Appellate approach. Under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, an appeal succeeds only if the extradition judge ought to have answered a statutory question differently and would then have been required to order discharge. The appellate court may intervene where the overall evaluation was wrong, but weight is ordinarily a matter for the judge who heard and assessed the evidence. The applicant’s attempt to re-evaluate favourable aspects of the CGPL reports did not identify an arguable error.
3. Article 3 framework. Article 3 is absolute. Under [1989] 11 EHRR 439, extradition is prohibited where substantial grounds establish a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. For a state party to the ECHR, there is a presumption of willingness and ability to comply. That presumption requires clear, cogent and compelling evidence to rebut it, with the burden then shifting to the requesting state.
4. Prison evidence. The District Judge was entitled to find that the CGPL reports contained ambiguities and did not consistently apply the personal-space approach required by Muršić. The reports therefore carried reduced weight. She was also entitled to conclude that the CGPL was not an internationally recognised source equivalent to the relevant European, United Nations or CPT sources, and that the material did not demonstrate an international consensus or a real risk of article 3 ill-treatment.
5. Fresh evidence. The 2026 CPT report and updated overcrowding statistics were considered de bene esse but were not decisive for section 27(4). General evidence of overcrowding could not establish the applicant’s individual personal space, particularly since the relevant prisons had not been inspected. The report concerning Fresnes broadly reflected evidence already before the District Judge and did not provide precise measurements sufficient to establish a sub-3 m² personal-space breach.

• High Court (Administrative Court): permission to appeal was refused by MacDonald J on 2 June 2026.
• District Judge Leong: extradition to France was ordered on 27 June 2025.
• High Court: Collins-Rice J refused permission on the papers and refused applications to adduce fresh evidence.