Ashish Magu v Criminal Cases Review Commission

At the permission stage of a judicial review challenging a decision of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the court asks whether there is an arguable ground with a realistic prospect of success. The court must respect the evaluative and predictive judgment entrusted to the Commission. It must not substitute its own view of the prospects of a criminal appeal or subject the Commission’s reasons to a rigorous audit. A decision is not unlawful merely because another court might assess the material differently. The Commission must apply the statutory framework lawfully, consider material submissions, and give sufficient reasons, but need not address every point individually. Where its assessment is tenable and its factual conclusions are not irrational, permission should be refused.

The claimant sought permission to judicially review the Criminal Cases Review Commission’s refusal, dated 27 February 2025, to refer his conviction for assault by beating under Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 13(1)(a). The conviction followed a rehearing appeal in the Crown Court at Hove, which had dismissed the claimant’s appeal while quashing his father’s conviction.

The renewed application challenged the Commission’s approach to alleged inconsistent statements and bad character evidence, its factual conclusions, its consideration of an alleged motive to lie, and its investigative approach. Permission had previously been refused on the papers. The central issue was whether any ground was arguable with a realistic prospect of success.

1. Permission refused. None of the claimant’s grounds disclosed an arguable ground for judicial review having a realistic prospect of success. Ground 5 was contingent on permission being granted on another ground and therefore also failed.
2. The Commission had to ask the statutory “double question”: whether there was a real possibility that the fresh evidence would be received on a reference and, if so, whether there was a real possibility that the conviction would not be upheld. That predictive judgment belonged to the Commission. The Administrative Court’s role was supervisory and it could not substitute its own assessment of the likely criminal appeal outcome. This approach was stated in R (Pearson) v Criminal Cases Review Commission and synthesised in R (Charles) v Criminal Cases Review Commission.
3. The Commission had reasonably treated the alleged inconsistent statements as material falling outside Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 98(a) and (b), and had then considered their possible admission as non-defendant bad character evidence under s 100, including s 100(1)(b). Its conclusion that admission was not reasonably arguable was tenable. Disagreement with that assessment did not establish irrationality.
4. The applicable irrationality test remained whether the decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person could have reached it. The claimant’s challenge to the Commission’s factual assessment amounted to disagreement with its evaluation of the evidence, not an arguable case of irrationality.
5. The alleged motive to lie was relevant to the credibility-centred application and required consideration. However, the Commission was not required to deal expressly with every submission. Reading its provisional and final reasons together, it had sufficiently addressed the alleged motive and explained that the assertion lacked evidential foundation. This was consistent with R (El Heri) v Criminal Cases Review Commission.
6. The court therefore refused permission for judicial review and invited counsel to draw the order.

The judgment concerns a renewed application for permission for judicial review. Permission had been refused on the papers by Collins-Rice J on 24 March 2026. The claimant renewed the application on Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5 on 31 March 2026. The Administrative Court refused permission.