The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, R (on the application of) v Police Conduct Panel

A judicial review of a police misconduct panel is concerned with public law error, not with conducting an appeal or rehearing the evidence. Appropriate deference is owed to an expert panel, while the court may examine the material before it to determine whether the panel failed to engage with a material issue or gave legally inadequate reasons.

Reasons must identify the issues necessary to the decision and explain their resolution sufficiently for an informed reader to understand the result. They need not address every argument or refer expressly to every item of evidence. Reasons may be inferred from the decision read fairly and realistically. The balance of probabilities remains a single standard, although inherent probability, the seriousness of the allegation and positive good character may be relevant to the assessment.

The Commissioner challenged by judicial review a decision of a police misconduct hearing panel dated 20 November 2024. The panel had dismissed allegations that Detective Constable Tyrone Ward committed gross misconduct by accessing confidential information about Wayne Couzens on police information systems without a proper policing purpose.

The challenge alleged that the panel had misunderstood the distinction between a detective sergeant’s core and spare shifts, and had failed to engage adequately with evidence from an exported case summary on COPA. Permission was granted on both grounds. The central issues were whether the panel’s conclusions were unsupported by the evidence or reasons, and whether its reasoning disclosed a public law error.

1. The claim was dismissed. The court held that the proceedings were judicial review proceedings, not an appeal or rehearing. The claim could succeed only upon identification of a public law error.
2. Substantial deference was appropriate because the panel was expert in police work and had considered extensive documentary evidence and live testimony. That did not prevent the court from examining the evidence available to the panel when deciding whether an error of public law had occurred.
3. The panel correctly applied the balance of probabilities. That standard does not become higher because allegations are serious. The inherent probability of the alleged conduct may nevertheless be considered, together with the seriousness of the allegation and positive good character.
4. On Ground 1, the evidence did not establish that a detective sergeant on a spare shift was prohibited from proactively checking custody information without a specific request from the core-duty sergeant. The core team had primary responsibility for such monitoring, but the distinction did not prevent a spare-shift sergeant from accessing records for a proper policing purpose. The panel had engaged adequately with the evidence and gave sufficient reasons for its conclusion.
5. On Ground 2, the panel was entitled to accept Ward’s evidence that he had looked only at the blank Facts of Offence section of the MG3 and had not appreciated its connection with the Sarah Everard investigation. Its reasons could safely be inferred from the decision read as a whole, particularly because it addressed an informed audience. The panel was not required to refer expressly to every piece of evidence or submission.
6. The court did not need to determine additional arguments concerning procedural unfairness or sections 31(2A) and 31(2B) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The claim challenged the decision of the police misconduct hearing panel dated 20 November 2024.