Jagathesan Nadson v Whiting Group Limited / Graham Shepherd & Ors

A statement of case may be struck out where it is incoherent, discloses no legally recognisable claim, or omits the essential facts needed to establish liability. The court may consider whether amendment could cure a defect, but that opportunity is unnecessary where the deficiency is substantive and the claimant has already had ample opportunity to articulate the case. A claim arising from a pension transfer is subject to ordinary limitation principles. Later accrual of alleged losses does not create a continuing breach where the pleaded loss resulted from a single historic act. Awareness of the essential loss and the persons allegedly responsible may defeat reliance on deliberate concealment under Limitation Act 1980.

The claimant alleged that advice and pension arrangements made in 2002 unlawfully caused the loss of his Guaranteed Minimum Pension rights. He sued the adviser’s corporate principal, an individual adviser, and later pension providers, alleging statutory, fiduciary and professional breaches, misrepresentation, deliberate concealment and continuing non-payment.

The defendants applied under CPR r.3.4(2) for strike-out and under CPR r.24.2 for reverse summary judgment. The issues were whether the claim disclosed a coherent legal basis, whether the individual adviser was properly sued, whether the alleged claims were time-barred, and whether the claimant should have a further opportunity to amend.

1. Disposition. The claim was struck out. To the extent necessary, reverse summary judgment was granted for all three defendants. The claim against Graham Shepherd personally was struck out because the documents showed that he acted as Whiting’s employee or agent, not in a personal capacity.
2. Incoherent pleading. The claim form and particulars merely listed categories of causes of action and omitted the essential factual and legal bases of duty, breach, causation and liability. The claimant identified no statutory provision which invalidated the 2002 transfer or made the later providers jointly and severally liable for an independently subsisting GMP.
3. Merits of the allegations. The contemporaneous documents showed that the claimant received clear advice that the transfer would convert the GMP into Protected Rights benefits, acknowledged that advice and authorised the transfer. Alleged fraudulent tampering and negligent failure to explain the loss were therefore manifestly inconsistent with the documents and doomed to fail.
4. Limitation. All primary limitation periods had expired. Sections 14A and 14B of the Limitation Act 1980 could not assist because the 15-year long-stop had passed. Section 21(1)(b) was irrelevant because the complaint did not concern trust property retained or converted by a trustee. Section 32 did not extend time: by 2014–2015 the claimant knew the essential loss and the persons he regarded as responsible. Windrush status and absence from the United Kingdom were not relevant disabilities. The alleged losses accruing over time did not constitute a continuing breach where the asserted loss arose from the single 2002 transfer.
5. Further procedure. A notice to admit facts could not cure the absence of a properly pleaded claim. No further amendment opportunity was required because the defects were substantive and the claimant had already had ample opportunity to explain his case. Non-response to a notice under CPR r.32.18 did not constitute deemed admission.