Aabar Holdings Sàrl & Ors v Glencore plc & Ors

Where civil and criminal proceedings substantially overlap, a stay or adjournment is discretionary. The court must assess whether there is a real danger of serious prejudice causing injustice in the criminal proceedings, while considering safeguards, open justice, fairness to all parties and timely justice. A witness summons requires a real likelihood that the evidence will materially assist the court. It may be oppressive to compel a potential criminal defendant to give evidence in civil proceedings before the criminal trial. An adjournment may therefore be preferable to refusing relevant witness summonses, particularly where safeguards would make the civil trial difficult to manage and would not eliminate the risk of prejudice.

The claimants brought claims under sections 90 and 90A and Schedule 10A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 concerning allegedly misleading prospectuses and published information. Trial 1, addressing defendant-side liability issues, was fixed for October 2026. A related criminal prosecution was listed for October 2027.

Glencore applied for witness summonses against A and B. A and B opposed the applications and sought an adjournment. The Serious Fraud Office sought continuation of confidentiality and reporting restrictions and controls on documents, evidence and judgment to protect the criminal prosecution. The central issue was how Trial 1 should proceed given the substantial overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings.

1. The applications for witness summonses and Trial 1 were adjourned. The court would hear further submissions on the length and precise terms of the adjournment. This was an adjournment of Trial 1, not a stay of the proceedings.

2. Under the overriding objective, the question whether concurrent civil proceedings should be stayed or adjourned is discretionary. The court must balance the competing considerations and ask whether there is a real danger of serious prejudice causing injustice in the criminal proceedings. The risk must be real, not merely notional. Appropriate safeguards in the civil proceedings may mitigate or eliminate the risk, but the court must assess whether they would do so in practice.

3. Absent the criminal proceedings, the witness summonses would have been justified. There was a real likelihood that A and B could give evidence materially assisting determination of the civil issues. The applications were accepted as made in good faith, notwithstanding suggestions that they were tactical.

4. In light of the pending criminal trial, compelling A and B to give evidence in the civil trial beforehand would be unduly prejudicial and oppressive. Refusing the summonses while allowing Trial 1 to proceed would prejudice the civil defendants.

5. The SFO’s proposed safeguards would make Trial 1 difficult and inconvenient to manage, require substantial private hearings and extensive redactions, derogate materially from open justice, and leave a real and not insignificant risk that prejudicial material would reach the criminal jury. The balance therefore favoured postponing Trial 1 until after the criminal trial.

6. The claimants’ prejudice from delay was limited. Trial 1 would not produce a monetary award, a further trial would remain necessary, and any delay in payment could be compensated by interest. The court noted that if the criminal timetable changed, the balance might later favour proceeding with the civil trial. Interim preparation and consideration of Trial 2 issues could continue.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.