Vanessa Picker v TEW

On an application to strike out a defence under CPR 3.4(2), the pleaded facts are assumed to be true and the court should strike out only where the pleading discloses no reasonable grounds. On summary judgment under CPR 24.3, the court may evaluate evidence, but must avoid a mini-trial and should permit the issue to proceed where factual disputes may affect the outcome.

In a defamation claim, a truth defence need not plead every element of a statutory criminal offence unless the pleaded meaning incorporates that technical definition. It is sufficient to plead facts capable of proving the substantial truth of the essential sting. Proof of one substantially true imputation may suffice where the remaining imputations do not seriously harm reputation.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning allegations of sexual assault made by the defendant in emails to university staff during arrangements for a non-contact agreement. The defendant relied on qualified privilege and truth, and disputed serious harm.

The claimant applied to strike out the truth defence under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b), or for summary judgment under CPR 24.3. She argued that the defence failed to plead the technical elements of sexual assault under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and that the defendant had no real prospect of proving the alleged events. The court also determined whether a mistakenly sealed provisional order should stand.

1. Truth defence. The claimant’s application to strike out the truth defence and for summary judgment was dismissed. The Amended Defence disclosed reasonable grounds under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, was not an abuse of process, and had a real prospect of success.
2. On strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(a), the pleaded facts were assumed to be true. On summary judgment, the court could evaluate evidence but had to avoid conducting a mini-trial. The court should hesitate to determine factual disputes summarily where fuller evidence at trial might affect the result.
3. The defendant’s pleaded meaning was not the technical statutory definition of sexual assault in section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The words were not pleaded as conveying every element of that offence. The defence therefore did not need to plead reasonable belief in consent or every other statutory element.
4. The essential sting was that the claimant sexually assaulted the defendant. The defence adequately pleaded that the defendant was too intoxicated to consent and was sexually assaulted. The pleading did not need to allege sexual contact described as “substantial” or contact going beyond kissing. Non-consensual sexual kissing could, depending on the meaning ultimately adopted, establish substantial truth.
5. The defendant had not clearly pleaded a separate non-consensual sexual assault on the morning of 3 October 2021. That omission did not defeat the defence because proof of non-consensual sexual activity on the night of 2 October 2021 alone could establish the substantial truth of the pleaded sting.
6. The defendant’s lack of memory created a trial issue, but the pleaded intoxication, surrounding circumstances, alleged account given by the claimant, and subsequent conduct meant that a reasonable fact-finder could find the sting substantially true. Credibility and the disputed events were matters for trial.
7. The mistakenly sealed order was varied. Paragraphs 3–4 and 6–12 stood, subject to subsequent orders. Paragraph 2 was varied to require limited further information concerning the alleged “friendly joke”, with the Re-Amended Defence to be filed and served by 4.30pm on 9 June 2026. Paragraph 1 was set aside.