Robert Geoffrey Richardson v William Beech Skip Hire Limited

Contributory negligence is assessed objectively. The claimant must take the precautions which an ordinarily prudent person would observe and must reasonably foresee the possibility of harm to himself, while allowing for the context of workplace responsibilities and the risks of industrial work.

Mere inadvertence or momentary error may be insufficient, but a deliberate decision to enter the danger zone of moving heavy machinery, where the claimant could readily wait for it to be isolated or switched off, may amount to fault. Any reduction must reflect causative potency and blameworthiness in a broad, just and equitable assessment. On the facts, the claimant’s contributory negligence was assessed at 20 per cent.

The claimant, an experienced engineer, suffered catastrophic injuries when a demolition grab mounted on the defendant’s Caterpillar Waste Handler moved unexpectedly and crushed his legs. The defendant admitted primary liability for its employee’s inadvertent operation of the joystick but alleged that the claimant had contributed to the accident by entering the space between the moving grab and the machine while the engine remained running and the machine had not been isolated.

The claim had previously been determined in the claimant’s favour on primary liability, with damages to be assessed. The trial concerned only contributory negligence, including whether the claimant was at fault, whether that fault contributed to the injury, and the just and equitable reduction in damages.

1. Applicable framework. Under section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the court asks whether there was fault by the claimant, whether the damage resulted partly from that fault, the extent of the claimant’s responsibility, and the reduction which is just and equitable. The defendant bears the burden of proving the allegation.
2. Objective fault and foreseeability. Fault concerns carelessness in looking after the claimant’s own safety. The standard is objective, and the claimant must reasonably foresee the possibility of injury to himself. Workplace context is relevant, including the expectation that others will perform legal safety duties, but a person cannot simply rely on others where the circumstances make the danger apparent.
3. Application to the facts. The claimant knew that the Caterpillar had restarted and could see the grab descending. He deliberately walked towards it, touched it and placed himself between the moving grab and the machine. The court rejected the contention that this was mere inadvertence. The danger of being trapped was obvious, and he could readily have waited away from the machine until it stopped and was isolated or switched off. His company’s risk assessment, although directed to machinery maintenance, supported the common-sense application of those precautions to work around running machinery.
4. Causation and apportionment. The claimant’s injury resulted partly from his fault because, had he not entered the danger zone, the grab’s sudden movement would not have trapped him. The defendant nevertheless bore substantially greater responsibility. It controlled the dangerous machine, failed to isolate or switch it off, and its employee inadvertently operated the joystick while the claimant was in danger. Apportionment required a broad assessment of causative potency and blameworthiness, without treating other cases as factual comparables.
5. Disposition. The claimant was contributorily negligent to the extent of 20 per cent. The court declined both the defendant’s proposed reduction of 33⅓–40 per cent and the claimant’s proposed reduction of 10–15 per cent.

The judgment records that, by order dated 18 July 2025, DJ Dickinson entered judgment for the claimant with damages to be assessed and directed a trial on contributory negligence. No appeal is stated.