C (A Child) (Care Orders, Section 20 Accommodation, and Deprivation of Liberty), Re

A care order is not automatic merely because the statutory threshold is satisfied. The court must decide whether an order is necessary and proportionate on the evidence at the date of decision, applying the welfare checklist and the no-order principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989.

Where parents have consistently acted in the child’s best interests, voluntary accommodation under section 20 may be sufficient. A care order is not justified merely to secure service provision or because the local authority considers parental responsibility administratively convenient. A deprivation of liberty order may be sought and maintained independently of a care order. Any restrictions must be necessary, proportionate and the least restrictive available.

The local authority sought a final care order and a deprivation of liberty order concerning C, a 15-year-old child with complex developmental, attachment and trauma-related needs. C had made significant progress in a highly supported community placement, but remained at risk of serious self-harm and harm to others during episodes of dysregulation.

C’s parents accepted that she could not presently live at home, but opposed a final care order. They supported accommodation under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The central issues were whether a final care order was necessary and proportionate, whether the proceedings should be extended, and the appropriate duration of restrictions on C’s liberty.

1. Care order and statutory timetable. The court refused to extend the proceedings. C’s care plan was necessarily dynamic and would change as her therapy and needs developed. The court’s role was to decide whether the statutory threshold and welfare requirements justified an order, rather than to supervise the care plan after the gateway into care had been passed. Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementations) [2002] 2 AC 291 was applied.
2. No order principle and proportionality. The fact that threshold was established, and that an interim care order had previously been made, did not determine the outcome. The court applied section 1 of the Children Act 1989, including section 1(3) and the no-order principle in section 1(5), to the evidence as it stood at the hearing. C’s parents had consistently exercised parental responsibility responsibly, worked with professionals and made child-focused decisions. A final care order was therefore neither necessary nor proportionate.
3. Section 20 accommodation. The court applied the guidance in Re S (A Child) and Re W (A Child) (s 20 accommodation) [2023] EWCA Civ 1. Section 20 accommodation was not confined to short-term arrangements. The local authority could continue to accommodate C with parental consent. A care order was not justified merely because it might facilitate service provision or give the local authority overriding parental responsibility.
4. Deprivation of liberty. The local authority could invoke the inherent jurisdiction because the restrictions could not otherwise be authorised and C was likely to suffer significant harm. Applying Re T (Inherent Jurisdiction: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWCA Civ 307, Storck v Germany [2005] 43 EHRR 6 and Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] AC 896, the restrictions constituted a deprivation of liberty. They were necessary and proportionate because C’s episodes of dysregulation remained unpredictable and potentially life-threatening.
5. The court made a permissive final deprivation of liberty order for six months. The restrictions were to be used only when necessary and in the least restrictive manner.