Marewan Faraj, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board of England and Wales

Under the Parole Board Rules 2019, the rule 12 deeming provisions for service do not apply to the time limit for making a setting-aside application under rule 28A. The application must nevertheless be made using one of the exclusive methods in rule 11, including the designated secure electronic address provided for that purpose. Non-compliance with that initiating requirement cannot be cured under rule 29 because no setting-aside proceedings have begun and the Board lacks jurisdiction until a valid application or initiation exists. Rule 9 confers an unrestricted power to alter time limits. That power may operate retrospectively, although retrospective extensions will be rare and possibly exceptional. Whether time should be extended remains for the Board to decide.

The claimant, a serving prisoner, challenged the Parole Board’s refusal to accept an application to set aside its final decision refusing his re-release on licence. His solicitors emailed the application within 21 days of the decision but used addresses other than the designated setting-aside inbox. The Board treated the application as received out of time when it reached that inbox and declined to extend time, considering itself bound by the Rules.

The claim raised whether the application was made in time, whether any defect in service could be waived under rule 29, and whether rule 9 permitted a retrospective extension of time.

1. Claim succeeded; remitted to the Parole Board. The court decided the Board had power to consider retrospectively whether to extend time, but did not decide whether an extension should be granted.
2. Rule 28A distinguishes between an application being “made” and being “served”. Rule 12 is directed to documents served under rule 11 and does not deem a setting-aside application made on the next working day. The claimant’s application was therefore made within the 21-day period.
3. Rule 11 applies to the making of an application. Its methods are exclusive. The phrase “a secure electronic address where one has been provided by the Board” meant the designated setting-aside email address accessible through the gov.uk website. The other addresses used by the solicitors did not satisfy rule 11, so the application was not validly made.
4. Rule 29 could not cure that defect. It operates on an error affecting a step in existing proceedings. After a final decision, the original proceedings have ended, and a setting-aside application is the initiating process which confers jurisdiction to revisit the decision. The approach in R (Lawrence) v Parole Board and another [2022] EWHC 1026 (Admin) was distinguishable because that case concerned a validly commenced claim followed by a curable procedural defect.
5. Rule 9 was framed in broad and clear terms and contained no temporal restriction. Read with section 12(1) of the Interpretation Act 1978, it permitted prospective or retrospective alteration of time limits. The disjunctive grounds in rule 9, the short primary period in rule 28A, the Rules’ treatment of finality, and their practical machinery for late applications supported that construction. Retrospective use would likely be rare or exceptional.
6. The Board, rather than the court, must decide whether the circumstances justify extending time.

First-instance judicial review. On 25 September 2025 HHJ Rawlings granted permission to bring the claim. The High Court (Administrative Court) allowed the claim in part on the legal issue and remitted the matter to the Parole Board.