Patrick Martins v The London Borough of Brent & Ors

Claims cannot be used to reopen welfare decisions made by the family court. A damages claim is an abuse of process where determining it would require the King’s Bench Division to reconsider whether the family court reached the correct decision, particularly where that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Claims against individual defendants must identify the conduct alleged against each defendant. Human rights claims under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 lie only against public authorities. A barrister retains immunity from suit for advocacy and submissions in court, including where dishonesty or bad faith is alleged. Negligence claims require a pleaded duty of care, and defamation claims must identify the publication, publisher, words, recipients, imputations and serious harm.

The claimant brought two related damages claims arising from family proceedings concerning his child. The Brent claim alleged breaches of Articles 6 and 8, negligence and defamation against a local authority and three individuals. The NYAS claim alleged breaches of Articles 6 and 8, negligence, complicity in fraud on the court, bias and discrimination against a charity and three individuals, including a barrister.

The defendants applied under CPR 3.4 to strike out the claims. The NYAS defendants also sought summary judgment, and three defendants sought a Civil Restraint Order. The central issues were whether the claims were adequately pleaded, whether they had any real prospect of success, whether they constituted an abusive collateral attack on the family proceedings, and whether the barrister was immune from suit.

1. Disposition. The Particulars of Claim in both actions were struck out. None of the claims had any real prospect of success, and amendment would be futile. The claims were also abuses of process.
2. The generic references to “the Defendants” did not identify what each natural-person defendant had done, the defendant’s role, or the legal basis of individual responsibility. That defect alone justified striking out the claims against the individuals.
3. Under the approach in Allsop v Banner Jones Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 7, collateral attack is assessed by an intense focus on the facts, including whether continuation would cause manifest unfairness or bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The claims sought, in substance, to establish that the family court’s welfare and contact decisions were wrong because of the defendants’ conduct. Reconsideration belonged in the family court or on appeal, not in the King’s Bench Division.
4. The Fourth NYAS defendant, a barrister, was immune from suit for advocacy and submissions in court. The principle reaffirmed in XGY v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2025] EWC (Civ) 1230 applied even where dishonesty or bad faith was alleged.
5. The Article 8 allegations did not reach the required severity threshold or identify an unlawful interference by a public authority. Article 6 obligations concerning procedural fairness rested on the court, not participants such as the defendants. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 also precluded the claims against individual Brent defendants.
6. The negligence claims disclosed no pleaded duty of care. Applying Poole Borough Council v GN [2019] UKSC 25, no special circumstances capable of creating such a duty were pleaded. “Bias and discrimination” were not pleaded as causes of action, and the alleged fraud on the court lacked the particulars and prima facie case required for an allegation of dishonesty.
7. Any distinct defamation claim required compliance with CPR PD 53B paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2. The claimant identified no publications, words, publishers, recipients, imputations or serious harm.

The judgment was a first-instance decision on applications in two related King’s Bench Division claims. No appeal history is stated.