Nursing And Midwifery Council v Teasha Tashai Pestano

Open justice carries a very substantial weight and can be displaced only by a sufficiently countervailing justification. A private hearing, restricted access to court records and careful drafting of documents may provide adequate protection without anonymising a respondent. Anonymity is therefore exceptional and requires cogent, case-specific evidence that it is necessary for the proper administration of justice and to protect the relevant interests.

An interim suspension requires evidence establishing that suspension is necessary for public protection or otherwise in the public interest. Where conditions can reasonably protect the public, suspension will ordinarily not be necessary. Panels must explain why conditions are inadequate and must engage with evidence of the registrant’s actual professional practice.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council applied to extend interim regulatory restrictions concerning a registrant. The respondent did not attend or appear by representation.

The court determined preliminary applications concerning a private hearing, advance notice of any application by a third party to access court records, and anonymisation. It then considered whether suspension or conditions of practice were justified on public-protection or wider public-interest grounds.

The court’s central issues were whether anonymity was necessary despite other protective measures, and whether the evidence justified suspension or only limited conditions of practice.

1. Open justice and anonymity. The court applied the strong presumption in favour of open justice identified in PMC v A Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 126. A hearing may be held in private where the relevant CPR criteria are satisfied and privacy is necessary for the proper administration of justice. The court granted advance notice protections concerning access to court records under CPR 5.4C, because the records included material considered privately.
2. The application for anonymisation under CPR 39.2(4) was refused. The applicant had not shown that anonymity was necessary. Privacy for the hearing and restrictions on access to the court record provided narrower protections. The respondent was not a child or protected party, the identity was not confidential, and the application lacked cogent, case-specific evidence.
3. Public protection. An interim suspension is justified only where it is necessary for protection of the public. The threshold is deliberately high. Following the approach in Persand [2023] EWHC 3356 (Admin), the decision-maker must identify the specific risk, explain why it is serious enough to require intervention, and explain why conditions cannot reasonably protect the public.
4. Evidence that a registrant has continued to practise without professional difficulty is highly material. Evidence from an employer may demonstrate either the existence or absence of clinical concerns. Here, the evidence of a faultless work history and the absence of employer concerns was not properly addressed. The panel could not rationally infer professional risk merely from conduct in the registrant’s private life without explaining the evidential connection.
5. Otherwise in the public interest. The threshold is also high and such cases are relatively rare, as described in R (Sheikh). The public-interest assessment must assume that the public knows the full facts and will form balanced views. The panel failed to explain why restrictions would be insufficient and used emotive descriptions of disputed facts.
6. The suspension threshold was not met. The court was just satisfied that limited conditions were necessary for public protection, applying the tests in Hiew. The application for suspension was therefore refused, with limited conditions imposed.