Edith Louis v Topaz Finance Ltd & Ors

An appeal under CPR 52.21(3)(b) requires proof of a procedural or other irregularity, that it was serious, and that it rendered the decision unjust. The test concerns trial fairness, not merely an appearance of bias. A judge’s imperfect treatment of a litigant in person, failure to permit opening submissions, or failure expressly to mention a pleading will not normally justify an appeal unless the conduct denied a fair opportunity to present the case or made the decision unsafe. The appellate court must assess injustice separately from the correctness of the result, although the correctness of the decision remains an important consideration.

Edith Louis appealed against the dismissal by HHJ Raeside KC of her claim concerning the appointment of fixed charge receivers over her property by Topaz Finance Ltd. She alleged that procedural irregularities at trial made the decision unjust, including an allegedly closed approach to her oral evidence, the absence of opening submissions, unequal treatment at the start of trial, and failure to address her Reply to Defence.

Permission had been granted for three grounds. A further proposed ground concerning the judge’s treatment and temperament towards a litigant in person was outside the permission order and was not considered. The central issue was whether the matters relied on amounted, individually or cumulatively, to a serious procedural or other irregularity causing injustice.

1. Appeal dismissed. The three permitted grounds did not establish an appeal under CPR 52.21(3)(b).
2. The applicable inquiry has three stages: whether there was a procedural or other irregularity; whether it was serious; and whether it rendered the decision unjust. The question is whether the trial was unfair, rather than whether the judge’s conduct created an appearance of bias. The categories of serious irregularity and injustice are not closed, but the established examples involved either an unjust denial of the opportunity to present a case or a decision rendered unsafe.
3. Ground 1 failed. Although some of HHJ Raeside’s comments appeared to favour documents over oral evidence, his judgment showed that he considered Ms Louis’s evidence, heard it at length, and assessed it against the documentary record. His reliance on the approach in Gestmin SGPS S.A. v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited did not establish that he had disregarded oral evidence.
4. Ground 2 failed. A judge may proceed without opening submissions. The judge’s abrupt treatment of Ms Louis and inadequate explanations were regrettable and might amount to procedural irregularities, but she was given a substantial opportunity in closing to explain her case and introduce further written evidence. There was no evidence that she was thereby prevented from making her best case. This was materially different from Dunbar Assets PLC v Dorcas Holdings Ltd & Ors and Frey v Labrouche, where parties were denied a proper opportunity to present argument.
5. Ground 4 failed. The omission of an express discussion of the Reply was not serious. The judge had considered the central issues, and the Reply merely repeated the assertion of the alleged agreements. The appellate court could not assume that the document had been ignored, and its contents could not have changed the result.
6. The alleged irregularities did not become sufficient when considered cumulatively. The court criticised the handling of Ms Louis as a litigant in person under the Equal Treatment Bench Book, but that criticism did not establish an unjust trial or justify setting aside the judgment. The later application to stay hand-down or reopen the appeal was refused; any challenge to this judgment required permission to appeal.

• Chancery Appeals (ChD) — The appeal against HHJ Raeside KC’s order dated 19 December 2024 was dismissed. The court refused to reopen the concluded appeal.
• County Court at Central London — HHJ Raeside KC dismissed Ms Louis’s claim for discharge of the fixed charge receivers.