UHF (R, on the application of) v Manchester City Council

In judicial review proceedings concerning an age assessment, permission should be granted where the claimant’s case, taken at its highest, could properly succeed at a contested factual hearing. The court should not refuse permission merely because the public authority considers the claimant’s adulthood obvious, where the adequacy of the assessment, the treatment of relevant personal experiences and the weight given to other age assessments remain genuinely arguable.

Delay and absence of communication do not, without more, establish abuse of process. The court must consider all the circumstances, the explanation for delay, prejudice, the possibility of a fair hearing and proportionate alternatives to strike-out. Where a claimant may be unable to engage because of ill health, a short stay may be appropriate while instructions, capacity and intentions are established.

The claimant challenged Manchester City Council’s determination that he was an adult aged 22. He alleged an unreasonable age inquiry, inadequate consideration of his experiences in Libya, reliance on appearance-based assessment, failure to investigate possible trafficking, and an erroneous conclusion that he was not a child.

Permission had initially been refused, but the claim was reinstated. Before the renewed hearing, the claimant’s solicitors disclosed that they had lost contact with him and that he had previously requested a temporary pause because of serious mental-health difficulties. The Council sought appointment of a litigation friend, strike-out for abuse or abandonment, and wasted costs. The central issues were whether there was evidence of incapacity, whether the claim should be struck out, and whether the grounds were arguable.

1. Litigation friend. Under CPR 21, a litigation friend was required only if the claimant was a child or a protected party lacking capacity within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The evidence showed vulnerability and serious reported symptoms, but did not establish present incapacity. The application was therefore adjourned generally with permission to restore if a suitably qualified clinician confirmed incapacity.
2. Strike-out. Under CPR 3.4(2)(b), the court may strike out an abuse of process or a statement of case likely to obstruct the just disposal of proceedings. Delay requires a broad and proportionate assessment of all the circumstances. Relevant matters include its length, explanation and responsibility, prejudice, the possibility of a fair trial and alternatives to strike-out. Continuing proceedings without an intention to conclude them may constitute abuse, but delay alone does not.
3. The claimant’s January email provided a possible explanation for the lack of contact and requested a temporary pause rather than discontinuance. There was no suggestion that a fair trial had become impossible. Strike-out was therefore refused. Permission was granted for a stay until 10 July 2026, during which the claimant’s location, condition, capacity and instructions were to be established. Without confirmation that he wished to proceed, the claim would be dismissed without further order.
4. Permission. Applying the approach in R (Muhammadi) v Liverpool City Council and R (FZ) v Croydon LBC, the claimant had cleared the arguability threshold. The dispute about reliance on appearance, the effect of his experiences in Libya, and the weight of the Home Office assessment could not be resolved by a preliminary knock-out conclusion. The three grounds were therefore arguable.
5. Wasted costs. The application was adjourned generally. Following Gray v Going Places Leisure Travel Ltd and Ridehalgh v Horsefield, the usual course is to deal with wasted costs at the conclusion of the proceedings, subject to restoration.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission was refused by Mr C.M.G. Ockelton on 14 November 2025. The claim was later reinstated by Christopher Kennedy KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 24 April 2026. On renewal, permission was granted and the claim was stayed until 10 July 2026.