Alan Davies & Ors v Ford Motor Company & Ors

When an amendment introduces a new claim after expiry of the limitation period, the court must apply the four-stage test under CPR 17.4. If the new claim does not arise from the same or substantially the same facts, permission cannot be granted under that rule. The court may nevertheless permit the amendment on terms limiting relation back to the application date, even without the parties’ agreement, because the new claim then falls outside Limitation Act 1980, section 35(1)(b). That power is discretionary and must be exercised cautiously, having regard to limitation protection, prejudice, case-management consequences, delay and the overriding objective.

The claim formed part of extensive group litigation concerning vehicle emissions and alleged prohibited defeat devices. After the principal liability trial had concluded, the claimants sought permission to add allegations concerning a separate SOx defect, SOx-related vehicle updates and associated statutory, contractual, consumer-protection, deceit and unfair-relationship claims.

Ford argued that the proposed claims were time-barred and did not arise from the same or substantially the same facts as the existing claims. The claimants relied on limitation exceptions, including deliberate concealment, and alternatively sought an order allowing the amendments only from the date of the amendment application. The central issues were whether the court had power to make that order and whether it should exercise its discretion to do so.

1. Permission granted. The claimants were permitted to amend in accordance with the draft Generic Particulars of Claim. The new claims were to be treated as brought only on 10 April 2026.
2. The four-stage test under CPR 17.4 was applied: whether the amendments were arguably outside the limitation period; whether they added a new cause of action; whether the new cause arose from the same or substantially the same facts; and whether the court should exercise its discretion.
3. The first two stages were satisfied. The amendments introduced new causes of action and were arguably out of time for most claimants. The proposed SOx allegations did not arise from the same or substantially the same facts as the existing prohibited-defeat-device claims. The existing pleadings did not put the alleged SOx defect in issue. Permission therefore could not be granted under CPR 17.4(2).
4. Nevertheless, the court had power to adopt the Mastercard approach. Under section 35(3) of the Limitation Act 1980, the restriction applies to a new claim deemed, under section 35(1)(b), to have been commenced on the same date as the original action. An order limiting relation back to the application date prevents that deeming provision from applying. Party agreement is not essential, although it may be relevant to discretion.
5. The discretion had to be exercised cautiously. Relevant considerations included whether the order preserved Ford’s limitation defence, prejudice, the stage reached in the proceedings, effects on disclosure and evidence, delay, future trial management and the overriding objective. The new investigations would be required whether the claims proceeded by amendment or fresh proceedings. Approximately 8,630 claimants had arguably in-time claims, and separate proceedings would create substantial inefficiency and risk deterring valid claims.
6. The court rejected Ford’s delay and authority objections. The application was made in the context of disclosure and the Tranche 2 trial, and sufficient authority from the solicitors had been established.