Marek Krzysztof Staniak v The District Court of Lublin, Poland

Where a requested person is a fugitive, the passage of time will defeat extradition only in the most exceptional circumstances. Substantial delay alone is insufficient. The court focuses on the effect of delay, including whether it has caused unusual hardship, injustice, or a legitimate sense of security. Culpable inactivity by the requesting state may be relevant and may determine a borderline case.

Oppression requires hardship going beyond the ordinary consequences of extradition. Fugitivity is a question of fact and evaluation. An appellate court will not interfere with findings that were properly open to the extradition judge on the evidence.

The appellant renewed an application for permission to appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against an order directing his extradition to Poland. The extradition arose from a conviction arrest warrant relating to offences committed in 2003. He had been convicted in his absence and remained outside Poland while enforcement measures were pursued.

Permission had been refused on the paper application in relation to Ground 1, which alleged that extradition was barred by the passage of time under sections 11(1)(c) and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The renewed application challenged findings that the appellant was a fugitive, that no exceptional circumstances permitted reliance on delay, and that extradition would not be oppressive.

1. Permission refused. Ground 1 was not reasonably arguable on any of the three bases advanced.
2. Fugitivity required proof to the criminal standard that the appellant knowingly and deliberately placed himself beyond the reach of the Polish authorities. The issue was factual and evaluative. The District Judge was entitled to rely cumulatively on the appellant’s knowledge of the proceedings, his departure from Poland, his failure to provide a reliable means of contact, and the timing of those events. Open residence or travel abroad did not, without more, disprove deliberate evasion. The expert evidence did not prevent the judge from reaching his own conclusion on the totality of the evidence.
3. Under Gomes v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21, a fugitive may rely on passage-of-time grounds only in the most exceptional circumstances. Under Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, substantial delay requires something more of an unusual or striking nature. Culpable and unexplained inactivity by the requesting state may be relevant, particularly in a borderline case: see also Zengota v Poland [2017] EWHC 191 (Admin). The District Judge was entitled to find that the delay and the appellant’s settled life abroad did not meet that stringent threshold, particularly where he knew of the proceedings and remained at large.
4. Oppression by reason of delay requires injustice or hardship going beyond that ordinarily expected from extradition. The assessment is evaluative and concerns the effect of delay on the requested person. The principles summarised in Scott v Government of the Commonwealth of Australia [2020] EWHC 2924 (Admin) supported consideration of fair-trial prejudice, the seriousness of the offence, length and culpability of delay, and any legitimate sense of security. The evidence about residence, employment and ordinary life in the United Kingdom did not establish the required additional hardship.
5. The renewed application for permission to appeal on Ground 1 was refused.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The renewed application for permission to appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order was refused on Ground 1. Permission on a separate section 20 ground had previously been granted by Mr Justice Mould.
• District Judge: On 21 August 2025, District Judge Bristow directed the appellant’s extradition to Poland.