Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Ltd v Julia McGeoch

An appellate court may strike out a later defence as Henderson v Henderson abuse where the defendant could and should have raised the substance of that defence in earlier proceedings concerning the same underlying matter. The court must make a broad, merits-based assessment of all public and private interests. The Aldi guidelines are potentially applicable to any litigation, including Part 8 blessing proceedings and proceedings before a foreign court, where later claims could affect the existing litigation. Failure to raise the later case is a significant factor, but does not automatically establish abuse. A collateral attack occurs where the later court is invited to reach a decision inconsistent with the earlier decision. Summary judgment may be given on a severable issue where no real prospect of success exists and no compelling reason for trial remains.

Ocorian, trustee of a Jersey trust owning Stapleford Farm, appealed against orders of HHJ Glen dated 23 February 2026 in possession proceedings. The County Court had dismissed Ocorian’s applications to strike out Julia McGeoch’s defence for abuse of process and to obtain summary judgment, and had permitted amendments and a counterclaim in part.

The earlier Jersey proceedings concerned the trustees’ application for the Royal Court’s approval of an equalisation and distribution plan. The plan contemplated selling Stapleford Farm to McGeoch for £2 million or evicting her and selling it to a third party. McGeoch later defended the English possession claim on the basis that she had a tenancy, irrevocable licence, proprietary estoppel or other equitable interest. The appeal concerned abuse of process, collateral attack, summary judgment and amendment.

1. Appeal allowed. The County Court’s orders were set aside. The defence was struck out, summary judgment was entered for the appellant on paragraph 6e of the defence, and permission to amend the defence and add a counterclaim was refused.
2. The appeal was a review under CPR rule 52.21. The appellate court could intervene where the judge below erred in principle, omitted material considerations or reached a plainly wrong conclusion. On a preliminary abuse application without oral evidence, the appellate court was often in as good a position to decide the issue.
3. The Aldi guidelines were potentially applicable beyond complex commercial multi-party litigation. They could apply to any litigation where further claims were in the pipeline and it was sensible for the court already seised of the matter to know of them. They could apply to Part 8 proceedings and to a Public Trustee v Cooper category (2) blessing application. The fact that the earlier proceedings were in Jersey did not prevent the application of Henderson abuse.
4. McGeoch could and should have raised at an early stage her case that she could not be removed from Stapleford Farm because of a tenancy or equitable licence. The material placed before the Jersey Royal Court focused on her proposed purchase and the price, and did not properly alert it to the substance or consequences of an irremovability case. That was a serious breach of the Aldi guidelines.
5. The breach materially affected the proceedings. If the defence succeeded, the approved equalisation plan would probably require reconsideration, causing further expenditure and delay and postponing the other beneficiaries’ distributions. The omission therefore constituted Henderson v Henderson abuse under the broad merits-based approach in Johnson v Gore Wood.
6. The defence also constituted a collateral attack. The correct question was whether the English court was being invited to reach a decision inconsistent with the Jersey decision, not whether the defence struck at the Jersey court’s central decision. Success on the defence would prevent the course approved by the Jersey court and require a different plan.
7. Paragraph 6e, alleging that the notice did not give reasonable time to vacate, had no real prospect of success. The respondent had agreed to six months’ notice and had in any event had more than two years between service of the notice and issue of the possession claim. No compelling reason for a trial existed.
8. The proposed amendments and counterclaim did not cure the abuse and would perpetuate it. Permission was therefore refused.

• High Court, Chancery Appeals List: Appeal from the order of HHJ Glen dated 23 February 2026. The order was set aside and the appellant obtained strike-out, summary judgment on paragraph 6e and refusal of the proposed amendments and counterclaim.
• County Court at Southampton: HHJ Glen dismissed the appellant’s strike-out and summary judgment applications and allowed amendments and a counterclaim in part.