CLT, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hounslow

A local authority cannot avoid the duty under Children Act 1989, s 20, by describing accommodation as a private family arrangement where it has materially arranged, sustained or provided the child’s accommodation. The question whether a child appears to require accommodation is fact-sensitive and must be assessed in light of the authority’s actual role, including decisions not to evict a child from council accommodation. Where the s 20 duty arises, the child is looked after and the associated statutory duties follow. Section 17 remains a target duty, leaving the authority a broad discretion over services and resources. Judicial review does not permit the court to substitute its assessment for that of social workers unless there is public-law error. The threshold for s 47 enquiries is high and operational safeguarding assessments attract restraint.

CLT, aged 16 years and 11 months at the hearing, sought judicial review of Hounslow’s failure to recognise him as looked after and to provide adequate accommodation and support. His parents had died, and he lived with his sister in a council property. A distant cousin, who had undertaken to care for them, later became frequently absent, leaving the children without effective parental care and in poor conditions.

The claim challenged the alleged failure to perform duties under ss 20, 22 to 22G, 17 and 47 of the Children Act 1989. The central issues were whether the authority had provided accommodation under s 20, whether consequent looked-after and eligible-child duties arose, whether its s 17 support was lawful, and whether s 47 enquiries were required.

1. Grounds 1 and 2 succeeded. The claimant was a child in need within the authority’s area. After his father’s death, no person had parental responsibility and the person caring for him was prevented from providing suitable care. The critical question was whether he appeared to require accommodation under s 20(1).
2. The authority had orchestrated the initial placement, vetted carers, arranged discharge and provided the council property. Its later decision to permit the claimant to remain in the property, pause rent arrears and prevent eviction supplied the stability of his accommodation. It could not rely on its own provision of accommodation to argue that the claimant did not require accommodation.
3. The purported private fostering arrangement was not sufficiently established. Its financial consequences were explained only retrospectively, and the authority continued to intervene materially when the proposed carer failed to provide suitable care. The arrangement therefore did not displace the s 20 duty.
4. The duty arose on or about 11 November 2020. The claimant consequently became looked after under s 22. As he had been looked after for the required period after reaching 14 and beyond 16, he was an eligible child under § 19B of Schedule 2, triggering pathway-planning and personal-adviser duties under §§ 19B and 19C.
5. Ground 3 was rejected as an alternative ground. Section 17 imposes a target duty. The level and form of support remain matters for local-authority discretion, subject to conventional public-law controls. The court could not substitute its own assessment of maintenance, tutoring or repairs.
6. Ground 4 was dismissed. The authority had undertaken assessments, maintained a child-in-need plan and provided support. Its conclusion that the high threshold of significant harm under s 47 was not met was not irrational.
7. The court quashed the failure to recognise the s 20 duty and granted declarations concerning duties under ss 20, 22 and 22G and §§ 19B and 19C of Schedule 2. A mandatory order specifying accommodation and damages were refused. The authority was invited to reconsider the case.