London Borough of Hillingdon v Springwell Lane Metal Recycling Limited & Ors

Under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a local planning authority need not exhaust other enforcement powers before seeking an injunction. The court must exercise its discretion for the statutory purpose and decide whether relief is just and commensurate, balancing the seriousness and persistence of the breach, enforcement history, urgency and environmental harm against private hardship and rights. Injunctions against persons unknown require a compelling need, a real and imminent threat, and appropriate procedural safeguards. Their terms should be intelligible and limited to what is necessary.

The Council sought final prohibitory and mandatory injunctions to restrain continued use of two plots as a scrap metal yard and further unauthorised development. A planning application had been refused and an enforcement notice had not secured compliance. The defendants included the company, its directors, the landowners and a class of persons unknown. At the final hearing, the court considered whether an injunction was necessary and proportionate, including whether relief could be granted against persons unknown. The first three defendants did not attend; one landowner attended for himself and the other landowner. The claims against the landowners were adjourned.

1. Disposition. The court granted final injunctive relief against the first, second, third and sixth defendants. The claims against the fourth and fifth defendants were adjourned, with the Council required within nine months either to seek relisting or to discontinue those claims.

2. Statutory threshold and discretion. Under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the Council had to consider an injunction necessary or expedient to restrain an actual or apprehended breach; it did not have to exhaust other enforcement powers. The court had its own fact-specific discretion and was not to reconsider the planning merits decided through the planning process. It had to exercise that discretion judicially and for the statutory purpose. The court applied the guidance in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (2003) 2 AC 558 and Ipswich BC v Fairview Hotels (2022) EWHC 2868 (KB).

3. Balance of interests. The court considered the breach’s degree and flagrancy, the planning and enforcement history, environmental harm, the prospect of further breaches, the effectiveness of other measures, and the defendants’ hardship and rights. The scrap metal use had continued and intensified after refusal of permission and failure to comply with the enforcement notice. The Green Belt and environmental sensitivity, reported harm and site fire reinforced the seriousness of the breach. Earlier enforcement steps had not worked; the criminal process could not itself secure the required prohibitory or mandatory relief. The defendants’ commercial and personal interests were considered, but little evidence of adverse impact had been provided. The injunction was necessary, proportionate and commensurate with the planning harm.

4. Persons unknown. Applying Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers and others (2023) UKSC 47, the court found a compelling need for relief not adequately met by other measures, with an ongoing and sufficiently real and imminent threat of further breaches involving unidentified people. The order was clear, precise and geographically limited, and included liberty to apply to vary or discharge it. The court concluded that an injunction against the sixth defendant was just and convenient.

5. Non-attendance and costs. The court proceeded in the absence of the first three defendants after being satisfied they had been served and notified, and that an adjournment would not serve the interests of justice or the overriding objective. The first, second and third defendants were ordered jointly to pay the Council’s costs, subject to detailed assessment, and each was ordered to pay £10,000 on account.

This was a first-instance final hearing. The judgment records that an interim injunction against defendants 1–3 was granted on 8 May 2026, and an interim injunction against persons unknown was granted on 10 June 2026. The applications concerning defendants 4 and 5 were adjourned.