Simon Goldsmith, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Public-law remedies are discretionary. When deciding whether to require a public authority to take a specified step, the court must consider the effect on the authority’s statutory functions and the public interest, alongside the claimant’s rights and all the circumstances. A quashing order will usually require a fresh, lawful decision, but an additional mandatory order is not automatic. It may be refused where an imminent review can provide up-to-date evidence and the resulting delay is unlikely to outweigh the benefit of that review.

The court had allowed Simon Goldsmith’s judicial review challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision not to transfer him to an open prison in an earlier judgment, [2026] EWHC 1626 (Admin). The parties agreed that the decision should be quashed and that costs orders should be made.

The remaining issue was whether the Secretary of State should also be directed to make a fresh decision within 21 days. The Secretary of State opposed that direction because a Parole Board review was due shortly and its earlier advice had become outdated. The court considered whether to compel an immediate decision before that review.

1. Disposition. The judicial review claim was allowed and the decision was quashed. The court refused the claimant’s request for a mandatory order requiring a fresh decision within 21 days.

2. Remedial discretion. Public-law remedies are discretionary. The court must consider all the circumstances and reconcile individual rights with countervailing public interests. It must exercise that discretion according to principle and avoid arbitrariness. The judge referred to R (Imam) v London Borough of Croydon, [2023] UKSC, and R (Edwards) v Environment Agency, [2008] 1 WLR 1587. A quashing order is the usual remedy and requires the decision-maker to reconsider lawfully.

3. Mandatory relief. The court’s discretion is wider when deciding whether to compel a public authority to take a particular action than when deciding whether to quash a decision. Relevant considerations include whether the order would unjustifiably impair the authority’s ability to perform its statutory functions and act in the public interest. Mandatory relief may be needed where the breach calls for compulsion to perform a clear legal duty. The judge applied Lord Sales’s analysis in Imam to the proposed deadline.

4. Application. The Board’s August 2023 advice was almost three years old and had been overtaken by the claimant’s transfer to a Category C prison in September 2025. The scheduled review would consider recent evidence, including the claimant’s response to that transfer and whether he had internalised his learning. Although the Secretary of State had other recent information, a decision within 21 days would still have to take account of the outdated Board advice. The Board’s updated recommendation would better inform the Secretary of State’s decision. The expected wait for the review and a further decision was unlikely to be significant, and the prospect of postponement was neither real nor substantial.

5. Orders. The decision was quashed. The Secretary of State was ordered to pay the claimant’s reasonably incurred costs, with detailed assessment if not agreed, and to pay 60% on account within 14 days of receiving the costs schedule. The claimant’s legally aided costs were to be assessed under the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013 and CPR 47.18.

The court had allowed the judicial review claim in its earlier judgment, [2026] EWHC 1626 (Admin) . This judgment determined the outstanding question of relief.