A v B and Others

A court may control disclosure in proceedings before it even where a related investigative order was made by another court. The court that made the investigative order is the proper forum for a direct challenge to its validity, but that does not prevent the court hearing a discharge application from deciding what disclosure is needed for a fair hearing.

Analogous authorities do not create a freestanding right to disclosure in civil proceedings. Fairness is fact-sensitive, and disclosure should be confined to material necessary for the fair disposal of the application. Rule 31.14 does not extend to underlying application documents or reasons merely because a witness statement refers to the order and material obtained under it.

The Director of Public Prosecutions obtained a without-notice unexplained wealth order and interim freezing order against B and associated companies under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The application relied in part on material obtained under production orders made by the Crown Court. The respondents applied to discharge the orders, alleging, among other matters, failures of full and frank disclosure.

At a directions hearing before the substantive discharge application, the respondents sought the material used to obtain the production orders. The DPP objected that there was no formal disclosure application, that challenges to the production orders belonged in the Crown Court, and that neither procedural fairness nor CPR 31.14 entitled the respondents to the material. The court considered whether the request was properly before it, which court should determine it, and whether disclosure was required.

1. Disclosure application. The ordinary route to disclosure under Part 31 is an application notice under Part 23. The absence of a formal application notice was not decisive at this directions stage. The request had been clearly set out in correspondence, draft directions and submissions, and the court could address a live disclosure issue capable of affecting the fairness or efficient disposal of the pending application (paras 12–14).
2. Which court should act. A direct challenge to the validity of a production order belongs in the Crown Court that made it, under the statutory mechanism in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. But the High Court retained control of its own process and could decide what disclosure was needed to determine fairly the application to discharge the UWO and IFO. The Crown Court proceedings remained relevant to the scope and timing of disclosure and the risk of duplication or inconsistent decisions (paras 15–17).
3. Inspection under CPR 31.14. The witness statement referred to the production orders and relied on material obtained under them. It did not mention or directly allude to the applications placed before the Crown Court or the reasons for granting the orders. CPR 31.14 therefore did not entitle the respondents to inspect those documents (paras 18–19).
4. Fairness and the request made. Authorities concerning warrants and analogous investigative orders did not establish a freestanding right to disclosure in civil proceedings, though they reflected a fact-sensitive requirement of procedural fairness. The court had to confine disclosure to what was necessary for fair disposal, weighing the evidential material’s relevance and the discharge grounds against proportionality, collateral inquiry, access to material already obtained, and the Crown Court process (paras 20–23, 25–26).
5. Result. Although the production-order material had formed part of the evidential basis for the without-notice application, the respondents had not shown that the underlying applications were necessary to decide the discharge application. The possible full-and-frank issue could be assessed on material already before the court, and disclosure risked duplicating the Crown Court’s function and producing inconsistent findings. The court declined to order disclosure at this stage and in this forum. The respondents remained free to pursue disclosure in the Crown Court and to seek to rely on any material that emerged (paras 24–27).

Not an appellate decision. The judgment records that Sheldon J made the without-notice UWO and IFO on 18 March 2026. The respondents' application to discharge those orders remained pending and was listed for hearing on 8 July 2026; this judgment determined a disclosure issue at a directions hearing.