UK Land and Homes Limited, R (on the application of) v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council

A temporary stop notice under section 171E of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 may be issued where the local planning authority thinks that there has been a breach of planning control and that it is expedient to stop the activity immediately. The threshold is low and involves discretionary judgment on the facts presently understood by the authority.

An erroneous statutory cross-reference does not invalidate a notice which, read as a whole, clearly identifies itself as a temporary stop notice and complies with the statutory requirements. A judicial review claim concerning a withdrawn temporary stop notice is academic where no continuing coercive effect remains. Interim relief should generally be refused where an alternative statutory appeal provides the proper route for resolving the merits.

The claimant operated a mixed leisure, food, drink and entertainment use on the rooftop of a multistorey car park. The defendant served a temporary stop notice on 21 October 2025 under section 171E of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The notice was later withdrawn after the activities ceased and a retrospective planning application was made.

Permission to seek judicial review was refused on the papers by HHJ Worster on the basis that the claim was academic. The claimant renewed that application and challenged the notice on grounds including alleged safety errors, procedural unfairness, permitted development rights, the scope of the red-line plan and an erroneous reference to section 183. A later enforcement notice and stop notice led to an application for interim relief. The issues were whether permission should be granted, whether interim relief was appropriate, whether the claim could be amended to include a warning letter, and costs.

1. The court admitted the additional evidence served by both parties. The material was reasonably confined, caused no unfair surprise and was helpful to the resolution of the proceedings.
2. Section 171E(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 establishes a low statutory threshold. The authority must think that there has been a breach of planning control and that it is expedient to stop the relevant activity immediately. The decision is discretionary and evaluative. It does not require proof to a particular standard.
3. The evidence of substantial unauthorised change of use, operational development and potentially serious safety, amenity and land-use effects was sufficient to make lawful service of the temporary stop notice arguable in principle. The court did not need finally to resolve the factual safety evidence. A real cause for concern was sufficient at this stage.
4. The twenty-eight-day permitted development argument was misconceived. The relevant question was whether the planning unit or land targeted by the notice had been in use for twenty-eight days, not whether each individual food unit or business had operated for that period. In any event, the claimed permitted development rights applied to land other than buildings.
5. The red-line plan did not unlawfully extend the notice to the whole building. Read with the operative text, it identified the relevant part of the car park and the specific activities to cease. The notice was sufficiently clear and was understood in practice.
6. The reference to section 183 in the reasons section was a misreference. Read as a whole, the notice plainly identified itself as a temporary stop notice under section 171E, complied with the statutory duration requirements and was valid.
7. The renewed judicial review application was refused. The withdrawn notice had no continuing coercive effect and the claim was academic. Permission to amend in respect of the warning letter was also refused because rolling judicial review was inappropriate and there were additional concerns about locus.
8. Interim relief was refused. There was no serious issue to be tried. The claimant had appealed the enforcement notice, providing an alternative statutory route for the legal and planning merits. Applying the principles identified in American Cyanamid, the balance of convenience would in any event have favoured the council because of the potential amenity and public-interest harms, with statutory compensation potentially available if the enforcement notice were later quashed on a relevant ground.
9. The council received £5,000 for the acknowledgement of service and £6,000 for the interim application and related attendance. It did not receive the costs of attending the straightforward renewal hearing.

• High Court (Administrative Court): HHJ Worster refused permission on the papers. On renewal, Mr Justice Kimblin adopted those reasons and again refused permission.