Jonathan Hanson, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board for England and Wales

Whether an oral hearing is required for termination of an IPP licence depends on procedural fairness in the circumstances of the individual case. There is no legal requirement that a hearing be reserved for exceptional circumstances. A statutory presumption favouring termination and a recent release hearing may reduce the need in some cases, but neither removes the duty to assess fairness. Osborn v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115 has a ratio concerned with release or transfer to open conditions, but its wider guidance on participation, disputed facts, risk assessment and the importance of what is at stake remains relevant. Guidance stating otherwise is unlawful or misleading.

The claimant, serving an imprisonment for public protection sentence, applied for termination of his licence under section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. A single-member panel refused termination on the papers and declined to direct an oral hearing. Reconsideration was refused: [2025] PBRA 86. The claimant challenged both the Parole Board’s Member Guidance and the decisions in his case. The central issues were whether the guidance unlawfully required exceptional circumstances or excluded Osborn v Parole Board principles, and whether procedural fairness required an oral hearing.

Outcome. The application for judicial review was allowed on both grounds.

1. The content of common-law procedural fairness is flexible and context-dependent. It must be assessed by reference to the statutory scheme, the functions of the decision-maker, the circumstances of the case and the importance of the decision. Fairness is not applied through rigid or universal rules.
2. The ratio of Osborn v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115 concerned applications for release or transfer to open conditions. Its wider analysis of the values served by procedural fairness, and its general guidance on participation, disputed facts, risk assessment and the significance of what is at stake, remains relevant to other Parole Board decisions, including licence termination.
3. The Member Guidance was unlawful. Nothing in the case law or the Parole Board Rules 2019/1038 required an oral hearing to be reserved for exceptional circumstances. Each termination reference had to be considered on its own facts. The individual’s release from custody, a previous oral hearing and the statutory presumption favouring termination might lessen the need for a hearing in some cases, but could not determine the issue in advance. The guidance’s statement that Osborn principles did not apply was also misleading and unlawful.
4. The initial panel decision was treated as having been made by reference to the unlawful guidance. The reconsideration decision substantially repeated the guidance’s narrow approach and failed to engage with matters relevant to fairness, including what was at stake, what the claimant could say about his recent progress, and whether a hearing was needed to test or clarify the concerns about the durability of his changes.
5. The saving provision in section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not apply. The court could not say that the outcome would highly likely have been substantially the same if the legal errors had not occurred. Both grounds were therefore made out.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was granted by Norton J on 5 January 2026. The underlying termination application was refused on the papers and reconsideration was refused: [2025] PBRA 86.