Jack Ambrose, R (on the application of) v Chester Magistrates Court

For special reasons under section 34(1) of Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, an unknowingly spiked drink can make the circumstances legally capable of justifying relief from mandatory disqualification where the alcohol attributable to the spiking takes the breath reading below the prosecution threshold. The relevant comparison is with that threshold, not merely the prescribed statutory limit. Delaroy-Hall v Tadman does not prevent that approach: it concerned blood samples, no spiking and a different evidential regime. Showing that circumstances are capable of amounting to special reasons does not require the court to find special reasons or grant relief. Magistrates retain a two-stage evaluative discretion.

The claimant pleaded guilty to driving with excess alcohol under section 5(1)(a) of Road Traffic Act 1988. At a later hearing, the magistrates accepted that his drink had been spiked without his knowledge, but found no special reasons and imposed a 36-month disqualification, a fine, surcharge and costs. Agreed forensic evidence indicated that, without the spiking, his breath reading would have been 36 µg per 100 ml, below the 40 µg prosecution threshold but above the 35 µg prescribed limit. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the magistrates had misapplied the authorities on spiked drinks and minimal excess. The central issues were whether the facts were capable in law of amounting to special reasons and whether the High Court could substitute its own decision.

1. Disposition. The claim for judicial review was allowed on both grounds. The magistrates’ decisions on special reasons, the financial penalty, victim surcharge, costs and 36-month disqualification were quashed.
2. Special reasons and the breath-testing threshold. Section 34(1) of Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 makes disqualification mandatory unless special reasons justify a shorter period or no disqualification. The four minimum conditions stated in R v Wickins [1958] 42 Cr App R 236 remained the governing framework. Applying the principle in Pugsley v Hunter (1973) RTR 284 through the later breath-testing authority of R v Cambridge Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Wong [1992] RTR 382, the relevant comparison was with the prosecution threshold rather than merely the prescribed statutory limit. The claimant’s circumstances were therefore capable in law of amounting to special reasons, although that did not require the magistrates ultimately to find special reasons.
3. Distinguishing the authorities. Delaroy-Hall v Tadman [1969] 2 QB 208 remained good law on a minimal excess over the prescribed limit where there was no spiking, but it concerned blood samples and a different evidential regime. It did not govern an unknowingly spiked-drink case involving the breath-testing prosecution threshold. There was no tension between Wong and Pugsley; Wong applied the latter’s principle to breath testing.
4. Discretion and relief. The special-reasons decision involved two stages: whether the circumstances were capable in law of amounting to special reasons, and whether the magistrates should exercise discretion to shorten or avoid disqualification. The second stage required evaluation of all relevant circumstances, including the claimant’s driving and roadside behaviour. Under sections 31(5)(b) and 31(5A) of Senior Courts Act 1981, substitution was unavailable because more than one decision remained open. A full rehearing was unnecessary because the factual findings were unchallenged. The case was remitted to a freshly constituted bench on those preserved findings. There was no order for costs by consent.

The judgment describes the following procedural path:

1. Chester Magistrates Court: On 30 September 2025, the court found that the claimant’s drink had been spiked without his knowledge but refused to find special reasons and imposed a 36-month disqualification together with financial penalties, surcharge and costs.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The judicial review claim was allowed. The magistrates’ decisions were quashed and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted bench for a fresh determination under section 34(1) of Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, using the preserved factual findings.