Heather French v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

A sealed final order refusing permission to appeal, including after an oral renewal, is a final determination governed by CPR 52.30. The High Court has no separate inherent jurisdiction to review it, and CPR 3.1(7), the overriding objective and other case-management powers cannot circumvent that rule. A procedural complaint does not create a nullity merely because it challenges the hearing’s conduct or the judge’s reasoning. Even if CPR 3.1(7) is technically available, reconsideration ordinarily requires a material change of circumstances or a misstatement of the facts underlying the original decision. Where neither is shown, an alternative application to set aside the order is an abuse of process and must be dismissed.

The claimant’s County Court claim alleged unlawful conduct by the Metropolitan Police. After an Unless Order application was dismissed, Sheldon J granted permission to appeal only on a limited apparent-bias ground and refused permission on Grounds 2–5. The claimant renewed those grounds orally before Ritchie J, who dismissed the renewed application. She then applied to the High Court to set aside or declare void that final order, relying on alleged mislisting, time pressure, omissions, factual errors, bias and an inherent or case-management jurisdiction. The central issues were whether the order was a nullity and whether the High Court could use CPR 3.1(7), CPR 3.1(2)(p) or its inherent jurisdiction outside CPR 52.30.

Application dismissed. The sealed order of Ritchie J, refusing permission after an oral renewal hearing, was a regular final order and was not a nullity.

1. Governing route. CPR 52.30 governs the reopening of a final determination of an appeal, and expressly includes an application for permission to appeal. It therefore applies to a refusal following an oral renewal hearing. Its stringent requirements cannot be bypassed by recasting the challenge as an attack on the merits, validity or procedural fairness of the decision.
2. Inherent jurisdiction. The residual jurisdiction identified in Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528 has been subsumed into CPR 52.30. Applying the reasoning in Ceredigion Recycling & Furniture Team v Pope and Cann [2022] EWCA Civ 22, and its reaffirmation in Vodafone Group plc v Ipcom [2023] EWCA Civ 113, there is no separate inherent jurisdiction in the High Court to review the refusal of permission.
3. CPR 3.1(7) and related powers. CPR 3.1(7) cannot operate as an alternative route to CPR 52.30. If it has any technical application to a sealed final order, it must be exercised consistently with the strict requirements of CPR 52.30. The overriding objective and CPR 3.1(2)(p) cannot provide a means of circumvention. The approach in The Queen on the application of Gregory v City University London [2016] EWCA Civ 898 was applied.
4. Nullity. The complaints about the listing, hearing time, alleged omissions, factual references and reasoning did not establish a fundamental defect depriving the order of validity. The authorities relied on to distinguish irregularity from nullity did not support setting aside this order.
5. Alternative ground. Even if CPR 3.1(7) were technically available, the principles summarised in Tibbles v SIG plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518; [2012] 1 WLR 2591 required, ordinarily, a material change of circumstances or a misstatement of the facts on which the original decision was made. Neither was established. The application was therefore also an abuse of process.

It was unnecessary to determine the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. The application dated 1 May 2025 was dismissed, with directions for the substantive appeal on the permitted part of Ground 1 to follow.

1. County Court at Central London: On 3 October 2023 HHJ Freeland KC dismissed the claimant’s application for an Unless Order and ordered her to pay the defendant’s costs.
2. High Court: On 5 February 2025 Sheldon J granted permission to appeal only on a limited apparent-bias issue and refused permission on Grounds 2–5.
3. High Court: On 10 April 2025 Ritchie J dismissed the claimant’s renewed application for permission on the refused grounds.
4. High Court (King’s Bench Division): Soole J dismissed the claimant’s application to set aside or declare void Ritchie J’s order. Directions for the substantive appeal on the permitted Ground 1 issue were to follow.